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―Just as throwing aid money at poor countries does not work, simply boosting investment is not the key to 
economic growth either. Only when capital is allocated to its most productive uses will an economy benefit, and 
this can only happen when governments are given incentives to respect and support those industries that can 
contribute to a country‘s longer-term potential. The ceremony to cut the red ribbon to launch the newest road, 
bridge or port is easy. The hard part is ensuring the longevity of infrastructure, which can only be achieved if the 
economy is growing‖ - Dambisa Moyo, 2009
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Executive Summary 
  
Popular claims link the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) almost automatically to economic development. 
This notion increased in prominence with the rise of neo-liberal thinking in the 1980s. It was also fuelled by the 
success of the so-called Asian Tigers achieving high growth rates, coupled with poverty reduction through an 
outward market-policy orientation. This study explores FDI in Southern Africa and Zambia specifically, based on 
the analysis of policy documents and interviews with a small sample of twelve Chinese and African government 
officials, CSO representatives as well as private sector representatives. 
 
Historically the main source countries of FDI funding to Africa are the United States, the United Kingdom and 
France. China has dramatically increased its presence in the continent in the past decade and became the 5
th
 
largest country of origin of foreign investment on the continent in 2009; its growing impact on trade, aid and 
investment in Africa has attracted increasing academic, media, and government attention. In the context of 
Southern Africa, South Africa is the most prominent investor from the region, capitalising on the geographical 
proximity of the African markets in comparison to other foreign investors.  
 
It is within this context that this study investigates the activities of Chinese investors in Southern Africa and in 
Zambia more specifically. In order to gain a better understanding of the specific consequences of Chinese FDI 
for economic development in Southern Africa, Chinese FDI is studied against the broader context of FDI inflows 
in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, with a focus on Zambia. The more general 
discussion is meant to provide a background for a more focused discussion of FDI in Southern Africa from four 
FDI countries of origin (in addition to China these are the United Kingdom, South Africa and the United States).  
 
The aim of this study is twofold. It will:  
(a) investigate the role of China as an investor and how Chinese FDI contributes to economic 
development and poverty reduction in Southern Africa and in Zambia more specifically; 
(b) investigate how SADC and Zambia manage the Chinese FDI inflow and its potential impacts on 
poverty reduction and how SADC and Zambia can benefit more from FDI inflows; 
The findings on these two aspects will contribute to identify opportunities for government officials of FDI host 
countries and NGOs to engage with Chinese investors and local stakeholders in the receiving countries in such 
a way that enhances the spin-offs of Chinese FDI with potential impacts for poverty reduction in the region. 
These will be put forward in this report‘s recommendations section. 
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Key Findings 
Africa is not a key destination for global FDI; it receives only 5.24 per cent of the world‘s total FDI inflow.
3
 
However, the past decade has seen the continent gain importance as a destination of global FDI, with its 
percentage of world total FDI inflow increasing seven-fold.
4
 Policy-makers in Southern Africa are increasingly 
focused on raising the potential positive impacts of FDI, with SADC member-states, including Zambia, passing 
specific regulations in order to attract more FDI. The key findings concerning this report are as noted below: 
i) Chinese FDI compared to other foreign investors 
 
There are obvious endeavours with all actors to support their companies to invest abroad, with the minimum 
effort being provision of information. There are, too, obvious linkages to the foreign policy agenda in all 
countries. Yet, important differences exist between the main foreign investors as well. An important distinction 
among the four chief investors in the region for example is the way in which FDI is differentiated from other 
international financial flows, such as Official Development Assistance (ODA). This distinction between ODA and 
FDI makes the institutional setting difficult to compare. Thereby, the division between public companies, SOEs 
and parastatal companies often leads to a blurring of the economic and political national policies with profit-
seeking strategies of companies.  
ii) Linkages with Poverty Reduction 
 
Generally speaking, the first priority of FDI from the private sector from any ―home‖ country (where the outflow of 
capital originates) is to generate a benefit for the investor. However, both FDI and official aid have a range of 
motivations, inter alia: practicing international solidarity, providing global public goods, addressing foreign policy 
concerns. The international consensus in ODA is that poverty reduction should be the paramount aim while 
private companies tend not to be primarily concerned about poverty reduction. Although, our findings indicate 
that some companies, including from China and South Africa, operate in Africa based on long-term relations and 
thus appear to be sensitive towards the social impacts of their involvements. For the South African companies, a 
long-term strategy is highlighted as useful and necessary since they are operating within their own region and 
claim that they want to maintain opportunities in the nearest markets for them. The Chinese approach towards 
long-term business relations in Africa is mainly based upon norms and values within Chinese business culture.
5
 
However, culture is a flexible concept and the organisation culture of Chinese multinationals can obviously 
change when they operate abroad for a long time.    
In general, the positive impacts of FDI to poverty reduction in the receiving country are indirect. For example, 
foreign investors are likely to make use of the local workforce (job creation) who have the chance to acquire new 
                                            
3
 See Annex Table 1. 
 
4
 See Annex Table 1 
 
5
  Guanxi (relationships or networking) is a key concept in Chinese (business) culture and means that Chinese business men put a lot of 
effort in building personal relations with their business partners in order to build trust and therefore to be able to close better deals (see for 
example Tong Chee Kiong & Yong Pit Kee, 1998. ―Guanxi Bases, Xinyong and Chinese Business Networks‖, in The British Journal of 
Sociology, 49(1), pp. 75-96.).  
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skills by working with foreign technology (transfer of technological knowledge and skills). These potential social 
impacts are however not the main objectives of the foreign investors and support from the FDI receiving 
government is necessary in order to use the full potential of FDI inflows for its citizens. It is recognised that the 
extent to which FDI inflows have positive effects on poverty reduction is highly dependent on the capacity of the 
receiving country‘s government to manage FDI inflows effectively. Furthermore, the intricate impacts of FDI on a 
given country are highly dependent upon contextual factors, as is shown in-depth by this report‘s case study of 
Zambia.  
iii) Performance host region and host country to attract and benefit from FDI 
 
SADC has passed a number of protocols and regional integration goals, such as the Financial and Investment 
Protocol (FIP) - approved in 2006 - and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), passed in 
2003, which aim to have a positive effect on the region‘s ability to attract and benefit from FDI. However, there is 
a distinct lack of ability by SADC member-states to implement the measures necessary to attract more FDI. 
Movement towards a common FDI approach is desired, yet the organisation has struggled to put a structure in 
place that can most effectively harness FDI inflows.
6
 Self-imposed deadlines for the creation of a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) or Customs Union within SADC have not yet been met, having ramifications for the targets to 
improve transport and to effect the more free movement of people and products. Resultantly the costs of doing 
business in the region continue to be high, acting as a possible deterrent to FDI. This report puts forward that the 
SADC region suffers from a key weakness concerning the management of FDI due to its ‗bottom up‘ approach to 
governance, in terms of which policy direction is given by individual SADC member-states, while the organisation 
assumes the role of a ‗higher‘ but more distant advisor and facilitator. This results in a key responsibility for the 
individual member states to implement the region‘s strategy towards attracting and managing FDI. This report 
contends that the possible benefits for economic growth and poverty reduction to be gained from FDI for SADC 
are not being maximised due to the lack of management of the FIP and FTA at member-state level, largely 
irrespective of countries of origin of FDI. 
 
The Zambian Government has managed to make the country, over time, a much more attractive destination for 
FDI by means such as opening business areas to private companies (privatisation) and new regulations to 
attract FDI. These economic reforms have caused Zambia to bolster its position in the Ease of Doing Business 
Index of the World Bank.
7
 It is, however, unclear whether foreign investors choose to invest in Zambia because 
of the relative flexibility concerning environmental and social regulations (stemming from the Zambian 
government‘s attempt to attract FDI to the country) or whether other possible reasons, such as diversity in and 
accessibility of raw materials, or Zambia‘s market potential play a bigger role in investors‘ decision-making. 
These alternative interpretations have consequences for the leverage the Zambian Government has in the 
negotiation with foreign investors, to make FDI beneficial for poverty reduction and to protect its citizens and 
environment against exploitation from foreign investors. 
                                            
6
 Interview with SADC FIP representative on 19 October 2010. 
7
  Zambia posted 90 in 2010 compared to 99 in 2009. 
 Page | 12  
 
Recommendations  
Following the general finding of this report on the importance of regulation in FDI ―host‖ countries (which receive 
the FDI), the main recommendations are directed towards the organisation of SADC and the Zambian 
Government.  
 SADC should improve its investment climate for foreign investors by reducing the costs of doing 
business in the region. One way of achieving this is by speeding up set targets for political and economic 
integration; improving interconnectivity and thereby enlarging the market size and attractiveness. 
 As a landlocked country, Zambia should put more effort into improving its infrastructure (e.g. through 
better linking ODA and FDI in a coherent step-by-step plan) in order to attract more FDI. More and better 
regulated FDI is a precondition to have increased gains in poverty reduction. 
 A lack of transparency within the Zambian government regarding deals with foreign investors was named 
as concern by Zambian CSOs. Increased disclosure on details of the deals by the Zambian government 
would be demanded from these actors.   
 Zambia‘s decision-makers need to consistently enquire about the protection of its citizens, future 
generations and the environment. Regulation of these aspects is arguably a key task for government 
when engaging with multinationals.  
 In order to better regulate FDI, the Zambian government should make information readily available to 
investors about rules and regulations in Zambia. One measure to do so would be a more frequent 
update of the website of the Zambian Development Agency (ZDA). Another measure would be to make 
Zambian business law available in Mandarin for Chinese investors, which could make Zambia a more 
attractive destination for Chinese FDI. Another positive consequence could be to improve law 
enforcement: Chinese companies who operate abroad have to comply with local laws and regulations. 
The first step to compliance is to understand the legislation.  
 In order to make an informed decision on how best to regulate FDI, the Zambian government should 
consider conducting a study on the reasons why foreign investors choose to invest in the country. If the 
reason is to be found in country-specific factors (e.g. raw materials), the Zambian government could 
better protect its citizens and the environment with stricter regulation without running the immediate risk 
of losing foreign investors. 
 NGOs can assist both CSOs and governments of the SADC countries with conducting such a study by 
providing detailed information on the motivations for Chinese investors to invest in the specific countries 
within the SADC region. 
 FDI home countries have limited legal responsibility for how their national companies are operating 
abroad since that would question the right of sovereignty. However, CSO‘s can use the technique of 
naming and shaming: publication of bad practices of companies from a certain nationality can lead to 
stricter control by their home government. CSO‘s could instead also focus on the consuming countries 
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and make information available about bad practices of companies in their country for the consumers 
abroad.   
 The findings of this study show that the bottom-up approach to governance of SADC is restricting the 
role of the SADC secretariat regulating and controlling FDI inflows to the region. The member states 
have a lot of clout and autonomy over their FDI inflows and SADC appears more as a facilitating 
authority. At present there is no common strategy concerning FDI in SADC. The first task for SADC is 
therefore to extract and promote lessons for the rest of the region. The regional body should study 
especially best practice examples in attracting FDI, not least so from Mauritius.
8 
While the first and 
foremost aim of SADC countries might be to attract FDI, disseminating knowledge on how to manage 
FDI in such a way that it benefits the development of the region should also be a key focus of SADC.  
 To the four FDI source countries researched in this report, we recommend the need to ensure a more 
comprehensive recording of data concerning their country‘s FDI outflow, in addition to making the 
information available for public access in the near future. As previously noted, the importance of African 
countries as a destination for global FDI is increasing despite their relatively small market sizes; hence it 
is crucial for FDI source countries to maintain records of their FDI outflows to them. At present there 
appears to be significantly limited collection of data concerning the SADC region. A more thorough and 
transparent recording could serve to benefit both FDI source and host countries: it could contribute to 
decreasing speculation of neo-colonialism of FDI source countries, in addition to the possibility of 
attracting further FDI for host countries due to heightened recognition of the possibilities of investing in 
the country. 
Areas for Further Research  
Some general points need to be made about the need for further research as a matter of caveats to this study‘s 
findings. First, more detailed, country-level studies are required to provide comprehensive insight into the impact 
of FDI on poverty reduction; this study provides points of entry for the discussion. For this baseline studies 
should be conducted and detailed analysis done of the sectoral and macro-economic contexts. This, however, 
was beyond the scope of the present study, which had a narrowly defined execution period. Secondly, the results 
of more country studies would allow for more grounded evaluation of good practice mechanisms to regulate FDI 
in a regional context in Africa. A 'more grounded evaluation' will be gained through a lengthier period of research 
that allows for in-depth field research and the development of a baseline in its design. National economies differ 
in structure and there is a clear risk of collective action problems based on differences in interests. The Zambia 
case should thus not lead to a one-size-fits-all approach, but rather serve as an illustrative case. Thirdly, this 
work focussed on the national discussion with links to regional rules. To complete the picture, more work is 
needed on the aspect of capacity-building for African policy-makers in trade and investment matters, not least so 
in the context of the broader debate on Aid for Trade (AfT). There is a need for an in-depth study on if and how 
China‘s involvement on the continent influences the capacity-building of African policy-makers.  
 
                                            
8
  See p.38 of this report for an explanation about how Mauritius made itself an attractive FDI destination 
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Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is often regarded as an essential element in any given country's quest for 
economic growth. As economic growth is understood as a key condition for poverty reduction to take place, 
some see FDI as an important, if not crucial, tool for poverty eradication. Organisations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank contend that attracting large inflows of FDI will result in economic 
development by stimulating infrastructural development and growth across different sectors of the affected 
economies. Thus not surprisingly, FDI has been at the centre of attention and debate for policy-makers in a 
number of developing countries, including Zambia.
9
  
 
It is within this context that this research investigated the activities of Chinese investors in Southern Africa and in 
Zambia more specifically. Historically the main sources of FDI funding to Africa have been the United States 
(US), the United Kingdom (UK) and France. China
10
 has dramatically increased its presence on the continent in 
the past decade and became the 5
th
 largest foreign investor on the continent in 2009. Its growing impact on 
trade, aid and investment in Africa has attracted increasing academic, media, and government attention. In order 
to gain a better understanding of the specificities of Chinese FDI and its role in economic development in 
Southern Africa, Chinese FDI is examined in the broader context of FDI inflows to Africa, and in comparison with 
the FDI from other main countries. The main research question is:  
 
How does Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) compare to OFDI from the three other main FDI 
source countries to the SADC region, and Zambia more specifically, and how are SADC and Zambia managing 
the Chinese FDI inflow with a view to its potential impacts on poverty reduction? 
                                            
9
   United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2010. ―South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development 
Partnership‖. [Online] Available: http://www.idisc.net/en/Article.39040.html. 
 
10
 Throughout this report, the term ―China‖ refers to mainland China, because the data used originates from a report of the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) which refers to Mainland China; data from the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau or data on 
Taiwanese FDI are thus not included.  
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This study is the result of two phases of research, namely: 1) an environmental scan; and 2) a deeper analysis of 
the data gathered in the first phase. The division into two phases with an initial scoping study allowed the 
development of a full profile of different stakeholders. The findings of the first phase led to a set of 
recommendations for the second phase of the study regarding the focus on the key FDI source countries, inter 
alia determining the best suited research methodology for further research.  
 
This report is based on the analysis of policy documents and interviews with a small sample of twelve Chinese 
and African government officials, CSO representatives (namely the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) 
and the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR)
11
) as well as private sector representatives. The 
interviews are conducted as semi-structured, mainly face-to-face interviews and some via telephone. The policy 
documents analysed are, amongst others: the Africa Economic Outlook 2010; MOFCOM‘s Statistical Bulletin of 
China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 2009; reports from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the 
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) from the US; reports from the Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation (DIRCO) from SA; and reports from the Department for International Development (DFID) from the 
UK.  
 
The critique on China that their activities on the African continent are not transparent and that they do not 
specifically disclose information on OFDI or ODA does unfortunately also apply in the case of OFDI from the 
other FDI source countries. The Office for National Statistics (ONS), for example, clarified that they were the key 
source for FDI outflow figures concerning the UK, and noted that the information they provided (see table 7 in 
Annex) was the only information they had regarding UK FDI to the respective countries and region, in addition to 
not being willing to disclose elements of it. In the process of gathering statistical data for the South African 
country profile, numerous South African financial institutions (South African Reserve Bank, South African 
Revenue Service etc.), government departments (Department of Trade and Industry, National Treasury etc.) and 
South African financial and economic experts were contacted; however little data was made available from these 
relevant sources. Furthermore, discrepancy has been found between data on Chinese FDI to Africa from 
different sources (see table 9 in Annex). In order to get data that is as complete and accurate as possible, the 
research team cross referenced all sources. The fact that most of the data on FDI towards Africa from all the 
main foreign investors is not readily available shows the relevance of this study and that follow-up research is 
necessary.  
 
Section one of this report defines FDI in relation to investments and aid. It also provides an overview of the 
literature on the potential impacts of FDI on poverty reduction. It analyses theories and practical examples about 
how FDI can contribute to economic development and poverty reduction. Section two explores the current global 
FDI trends in Africa and in Zambia more specifically. It explores the state and trends in FDI inflows to the 
continent over the last decade, and identifies the key source countries of FDI in Africa and the SADC region. 
                                            
11
  The decision for the selection of these two Zambian CSOs by the CCS Research Team was mainly methodological and based upon 
response.    
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Section 3 provides profiles of the current four main home countries of investors to the SADC region, namely: the 
US, the UK, China and South Africa (SA). It discusses the policies, rules and regulations of these four main FDI 
source countries regarding OFDI to Africa, identifies the main authorities, key companies and state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) involved in it, and highlights their specific roles. It thereby also explores the connection 
between FDI and ODA
12
 within the four main FDI home countries. 
 
Section 4 and 5 present analyses of how SADC and Zambia, as the respective host region and country of FDI, 
attract FDI and manage the potential impacts. The sections identify the relevant policies, rules and regulations of 
SADC and Zambia to attract FDI and evaluate the perceived attractiveness of the investment climate by the 
investors. Has Zambia made itself an attractive destination for FDI from China and elsewhere – and if so, how? 
Furthermore, the sections evaluate if and how FDI to SADC and Zambia contributed to poverty reduction; this 
requires particularly identifying the policies, rules and regulations of SADC and Zambia to manage FDI. The 
sections conclude with recommendations for improvement in the attracting of FDI and, drawn from stakeholder 
interviews, suggestions for raising the benefits of FDI. 
 
                                            
12
  ODA is a term defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as: ―Flows of official financing 
administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are 
concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 per cent (using a fixed ten per cent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows 
comprise contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (―bilateral ODA‖) and to multilateral institutions. 
ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions. Lending by export credit agencies—with the pure 
purpose of export promotion—is excluded.‖ [Online] Available:  http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6043.  
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1. Conceptualising FDI 
 
In its classic definition, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is an organisation‘s physical financial investment into 
establishing facilities in an economy other than its economy of origin.
13
 In recent years, this definition has been 
broadened and includes a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise 
and implies that the investor has a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise.
14
 The 
institutions from both the FDI source and the FDI host countries which were interviewed in the course of the 
present study follow the same definition of FDI as the IMF and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), namely: to be considered FDI, it must be in a venture
15
 that lasts longer than twelve 
months and it must be an investment of more than ten per cent in a particular enterprise. An ownership of at 
least ten per cent of the voting power of the enterprise
16 
is regarded as the necessary evidence that the investor 
has sufficient influence to have an effective voice in its management.
17
  
 
FDI usually comes in the form of equity
18 
or loans. Ownership of land and buildings by a non-resident is treated 
as an equity investment by the non-resident in a resident notional enterprise, which in turn is treated as the 
owner of the land and buildings. FDI is different from Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI), which includes 
investments via equity instruments (stocks) or debt (bonds) of a foreign enterprise which does not necessarily 
                                            
13
  Graham, J., and Barry, R., 2004. ―Understanding Foreign Direct Investment‖ in Citibank Business Portal. [Online] Available: 
http://www.going-global.com/articles/understanding_foreign_direct_investment.htm [27 July 2010]. 
 
14
  OECD, Glossary of Foreign Direct Investment Terms and Definitions. [Online] Available: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/1/2487495.pdf . 
 
15
   A venture is a start-up firm or small business with exceptional growth potential with high risks involved. 
 
16
   An enterprise is an institutional unit engaged in production. An enterprise may be a corporation, a non-profit institution, or an      
unincorporated enterprise (OECD glossary, [Online] Available: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/1/2487495.pdf). 
 
17
   As explained by the OECD, in some cases ten per cent ownership of the voting power may not lead to the exercise of any significant 
influence; indeed an investor may own less than ten per cent but actually have an effective voice in the enterprise‘s management. 
Nevertheless it is necessary to use the same percentage to ensure statistical consistency across countries. 
 
18
   Equity is the capital of a firm, after deducting any liabilities to outsiders other than shareholders, who are typically the legal owners of the 
firm‘s equity. This ownership right is the reason why shares are also known as equities (The Economist, Research Tools, [Online] Available:  
http://www.economist.com/research/economics/alphabetic.cfm?letter=E#equity) . 
 
 
 Page | 18  
 
represent a long-term interest. Despite stocks and bonds being excluded from the definition of FDI, there is FDI 
in the financial sector, for example: lasting investments in banks, insurance companies and other financial 
institutions. It is therefore important to note that FDI is different from trade. For example, by buying barrels of oil 
from, say, Angola and Nigeria, China is not investing in the resource sectors of the respective countries.  
 
Furthermore, for the purposes of this study, the basic distinction between FDI inflow and outflow is important. 
FDI outflow denotes the amount of FDI leaving a continent, region or country, whereby local capital is invested in 
some foreign resource. In comparison, FDI inflow refers to the amount of FDI entering a continent, region or 
country, where the investment of foreign capital occurs in host country resources. The total FDI inflow and 
outflow result in a net FDI inflow that is either positive or negative in the respective country. The cumulative 
number of FDI for a given period is referred to as FDI stock.  
 
FDI is often referred to as private investment and therefore distinguished from public funding. In practice, 
however, and with particular relevance to Chinese FDI, the distinction is more blurred since investments from 
SOEs are also taken into account. The data
19
 on FDI inflows used in section two of this report refers to both 
private investments and investments from SOEs, since the sources used do not draw a distinction between the 
two. This report is positioned at the (thin) line between ODA and FDI; both practices can be perceived as 
investments, however, the two main differences are that: 1) the international consensus stipulates that the 
paramount aim of ODA should be poverty reduction and; 2) FDI always results in (shared) ownership of the 
organisation invested in whereas the stated goal of ODA is to empower the recipient country. The findings of our 
research indicates that it would be useful to distinguish between public and private investments since different 
regulations, incentives and levels of government support exist which in turn have an influence on the effects of 
the FDI for the host/receiving country. Distinguishing between public and private investments in a Western 
perspective is closely linked to the discussion of aid and trade and thus affects the defining lines between ODA 
and FDI. Is aid a form of (state-induced) investment? Should FDI therefore count as a form of (private or SOE 
led) development cooperation, or not?
20 
  
  
FDI is often regarded as an essential element in any given country's quest for economic growth, which, in turn, is 
generally seen as precondition for poverty reduction. Consequently, some see FDI as an important tool for 
poverty reduction. In recent years, debate has heightened around the contribution of aid to development and 
growth in Africa, in comparison to FDI inflows. The effectiveness of these different funding methods for 
development is still in the process of being evaluated. This debate is of key importance to Africa, as the region is 
home to a significant number of the world‘s least developed and most poverty-stricken countries. As a continent 
                                            
19
  A number of precincts were experienced during gathering the data about FDI in the region from the all four of the FDI home countries and 
this made comparison between the strategies of and challenges for these host countries quite difficult. Section 6.4 on recommendations in 
the conclusion of this report will discuss these difficulties more in-depth. 
 
20
  Interviews with representatives of government officials from FDI home countries suggest that the divide between ODA and FDI is at least     
disputable. In section three of this report, on the differences and similarities between the strategies, policies and institutional framework of 
the four main investors in Southern Africa, the different ways of how FDI and ODA are institutionalised in the respective FDI home countries 
are further explained. 
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consisting of developing countries, the potential for African economies to benefit from FDI is considerable. Not 
surprisingly, FDI has been at the centre of attention and debate for policy-makers in a number of developing 
countries, including the country case used, Zambia. However, research has shown that FDI can have 
dramatically different impacts – both positive and negative. This may be due to the type of FDI as well as 
contextual factors such as varying human resources, financial systems in FDI receiving countries and 
institutional constraints.
21
  
 
The growth-enhancing effects of FDI inflows are influenced, amongst others, by the chosen mode of FDI. A 
distinction is made between so-called 'greenfield' FDI and 'brownfield' FDI. Greenfield FDI refers to a form of FDI 
where a parent company starts a new venture in a foreign country, constructing new operational facilities from 
the ground up. In addition to building new facilities, most parent companies also create new long-term jobs in the 
foreign country by hiring new employees, resulting in a substantial inflow of physical capital. On the other hand, 
under brownfield investment the multinational corporation (MNC) holds already existing facilities in the host 
country. Brownfield FDI is thus expected to result in a limited increase in the stock of physical capital, since a 
change in ownership does not necessarily have to result in an inflow of new capital. Therefore, greenfield and 
brownfield FDI are expected to affect host country growth differently. Literature, however, does not provide a 
consensus on where the maximum effects for the host country is to be found when comparing greenfield or 
brownfield FDI. Despite brownfield FDI resulting in a smaller inflow of physical capital, some authors argue that 
brownfield FDI, in the form of a merger or joint venture, could maximise the potential for technology spill-over.
22
 
This distinction between greenfield and brownfield investments is an important topic in the academic literature on 
FDI. This issue will, however, not be further explored in this report, as the focus is not on the level of investing 
companies. Instead, the report provides a discussion on the broader frameworks of FDI home and receiving 
countries. 
 
Another seemingly important distinction in the debate – and one with key relevance to this report – is between 
FDI from developed countries versus FDI from the so-called emerging countries, namely Brazil, India, China, 
Russia and also SA amongst others. Although modest in size relative to global FDI inflows
23
, FDI inflow from 
emerging countries assumes considerable importance for host developing countries, as illustrated in the 
following chapter. It is suggested that emerging country foreign affiliates may be able to interact more effectively 
with domestic firms in host developing countries than affiliates of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) from 
developed countries.
24
 This has been attributed to the ―greater familiarity of emerging markets MNEs with 
                                            
21
  Moran, T.H., Graham, E.M., Blomström, M. [eds]. 2005. ―Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?‖ in Institute for 
International Economics, Washington DC. 
 
22
  Rădulescu, M., and Dascalu, N. M., 2008. ―Foreign Direct Investment Flows and Economic Growth‖ Faculty of Economy of the  University 
of Oradea in Rumenia, Pages 493-497 [Online] Available: http://steconomice.uoradea.ro/anale/volume/2008/v3-finances-banks-
accountancy/1002.pdf [Accessed on 26 July 2010]. 
 
23
  See statistics cited in section 2‘.  
 
24
  Rădulescu, M., and Dascalu, N. M., 2008. ―Foreign Direct Investment Flows and Economic Growth‖ Faculty of Economy of the             
University of Oradea in Rumenia, Pages 493-497. [Online] Available:  http://steconomice.uoradea.ro/anale/volume/2008/v3-finances-banks-
accountancy/1002.pdf  [Accessed on 26 July 2010] and Cuervo-Cazurra, A., and Genc, M., 2008. ―Transforming Disadvantages into 
Advantages: Developing-Country MNEs in the Least Developed Countries‖, Journal of International Business Studies, 39, pp. 957-979. 
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technology and business practices suitable for low-income developing countr[ies]‖
25
 resulting in their projects 
―fitting‖ better to local conditions. Therefore, the impact of technological spill-overs from emerging country TNCs 
on economic growth, eventually enhancing poverty reduction, can also be expected to be higher. 
 
 
Contextual factors that might hinder or stimulate positive impacts of FDI on economic growth and poverty 
reduction are for example, appropriate host-country policies and a basic level of development. It must be 
stressed that FDI ―will only lead to economic growth if FDI inflows are well managed and are used for 
investments that will encourage (further) growth,‖ emphasising how positive growth can only be obtained from 
sustainable and efficient investments.
26 
In addition, research undertaken by the Labour Resource and Research 
Institute (LaRRI) stressed that it is the responsibility of governments to ensure the appropriate political and 
macroeconomic conditions are in place so that FDI contributes to the country‘s development aspirations, as 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
25
  Hauser, H. ―Outward foreign direct investment from emerging economies: New players in the world economy? Emerging market 
forum.Draft discussion.‖ [Online] Available: 
http://www.emergingmarketsforum.org/papers/pdf/2006%20EMF%20FDI%20Outflows%20Draft.pdf  [Accessed on 7 December 2010]. 
26
  Bezuidenhout, H. 2009. ―A Regional Perspective on Aid and FDI in Southern Africa‖ in International Advances in Economic Research, 15 
(3). 
 
 
Box 1. The Knowledge Gap in African FDI Reporting 
 
While there is little doubt that the rise of Chinese investment and trade with underdeveloped and developing African states 
has provided these nations with an unparalleled opportunity to revitalize their economies, there exists a knowledge gap 
between the media reports on announced investments, and real, critical assessment and analysis of the actual impacts and 
outcomes of investments made and projects completed. These reports reinforce ‗neo-colonial‘ stereotyping more than that 
they provide any actual assessment of the situation across the many different African societies affected.  
 
The little coherent information made available and a lack of academic research based on empirical evidence presents an 
obvious problem in assessing the real impacts all the so-called Chinese opportunities are having on various development 
regimes across the African continent. Lum et al. (2009) for example, conducted research on China‘s Foreign Aid activities in 
Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, ―largely based upon news reports of Chinese foreign economic activity, PRC 
foreign assistance and government-supported economic projects‖ (2009: in the summary). News reports can only be used as 
sources for academic research when the objective is a discourse analysis. News paper articles cannot be used for extracting 
statistical facts. Investments are often presented in newspapers as statistical facts, while in reality based upon the comments 
of one person, as for example the news that China will soon invest 10 billion USD in Zimbabwe that spread rapidly all over 
the world, without being confirmed by a Chinese source (for example Reuters 2010).    
 
Statistics from official national statistical organizations also need to be treated with care, since the government in power has 
its own agenda and can make FDI amounts look either more or less than they actually are. Sanfilippo (2010) uses for 
example official data from MOFCOM in order to analyse empirically the determinants of Chinese OFDI to 41 African 
countries. However, we found during our research that the official amounts can differ between the national statistical 
organizations of different countries. For example, the total amount of FDI from China to South Africa that the Chinese 
Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (2010) published is different from the total amount the South 
African government has recorded. Since this flaw is recognized by both countries, China and South Africa established a joint 
committee working on comparing the different amounts in order to acquire more accurate amounts of the FDI flows between 
the two countries.
1
  
 
These examples show that there is an urgent need for academic and scholarly research- baseline studies conducted by the 
many academic think tanks, institutions and organizations. As such, this research is not being done to the scale or depth that 
the real dynamics of Chinese engagement with different actors and regions in different African settings is fully understood. 
The gap is a real obstacle to understanding, and thus promoting best practice in foreign investment in Africa. 
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opposed to solely generating profits for the foreign investor.
27
 Given this, this study seeks to provide a better 
understanding of how Chinese FDI fits in the bigger picture of a host country context. A key aspect under 
investigation is whether host countries engage with Chinese FDI in such a way that it is beneficial for both 
investor and host country. Policy advice will then – based on the findings – explore how host countries could 
improve their ability to reap the benefits of FDI inflows for their own national development and where external 
actors (like China) can be supportive in these policies with a view to contribute to poverty reduction.  
 
The next section will provide an overview of the trends in FDI and serves as a background for the later analyses 
of the report. 
 
 
2. Trends in FDI  
 
2.1  Global FDI Trends 
 
Both developing and developed countries are the recipients of FDI inflow; globally, developed countries account 
for the majority of FDI outflow. However, the share of global FDI inflow accounted for by developing countries is 
increasing, due to the reform and growth taking place in these economies. This is closely linked to increased 
openness to FDI and globally connected production chains.
28
 The financial crisis of 2008/09 appears to have 
resulted in a dent in the overall volumes of global FDI. FDI flow to Africa dropped by 18.9 per cent in 2009.
29
 In 
2009, the total volume of FDI inflow across the world decreased by 37 per cent from 2008.
30
 
 
At the same time, the crisis has reinforced the pattern of developing countries gaining in importance as FDI 
destinations. The largest decline in FDI inflow was experienced by the US at 60 per cent, followed by the 
European Union (EU) by 32.6 per cent. This appears to be in line with the fact that the US and European 
countries faced the largest fallouts of the liquidity strains of 2008/9, which arose due to the increase in the 
practice of ‗securitisation‘ within the financial industry and the respective business models followed by banks.
31 
It 
                                            
27
  Mwilima, N. 2003. ―Foreign Direct Investment in Africa‖ in Social Observatory Pilot Project, Final Draft Report for the Labour Resource and 
Research Institute: 29-45. 
 
28
  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2010. ―World  Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy‖ New York and 
Geneva: United Nations Publication. 
 
29
  See Table 1 in Annex. 
 
30
  See Table 1 in Annex for details of FDI inflow per region. 
 
31
  Nesvetailova, A., and Palan, R., 2008. ―A Very North Atlantic Credit Crunch: Geopolitical Implications of the Global Liquidity Crisis‖ Journal 
of International Affairs, 62(1):165-185 
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is apparent that the effect of the financial and economic crisis on developed countries was more substantial than 
the subsequent impact on developing countries, unlike previous economic slumps. The shift in FDI inflow 
towards developing and transition economies is therefore expected to accelerate. Already in 2009, developing 
and transition economies together absorbed half of global FDI inflow. 
 
 Figure 1: Volume of FDI inflow per region from 2000-2009 (in USD million)
32
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2.2  FDI in Africa 
 
Africa is gaining importance as a destination of global FDI, albeit from a lower basis than other regions. The year 
2009 was somewhat unusual in this regard: On the continental level, Africa received lower levels of FDI inflow in 
2009 than the past two consecutive years. However, Table 1 in the annex shows that the total volume of FDI 
inflow to Africa has increased by 595.82 per cent from 2000 to 2009. The overall percentage of Africa's FDI 
inflow in comparison to the world total is increasing. It can be therefore argued that Africa is becoming a more 
popular destination for FDI, even if this might not yet be a consolidated long-term trend. 
This growth in importance is linked to the increasing levels of FDI that African countries receive from emerging 
economies. While the FDI inflow into the region from developed as well as emerging countries dropped during 
2009, FDI from emerging countries picked up again earlier and the increased investments from countries like 
China, India and SA compensated for the loss of FDI from developed countries.  
 
                                            
32
  All statistics gathered from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2010. ―World Investment Report 2010:  Investing 
in a Low-Carbon Economy‖ New York and Geneva: United Nations Publication. Statistics last accessed on 25.08.2010  from 
http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=4031.htm 
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Yet, at present there is not a distinct regional composition of FDI inflow to Africa: instead, the countries with 
larger FDI inflow ―tend to hold significant natural resource endowments, active privatisation programmes, 
liberalised FDI policies and vigorous investment promotion activities.‖
33
 It can be seen that FDI inflows vary 
widely by region, sector and country. In 2009 it was West Africa which gained the fastest increase (63 per cent), 
over its 2007 figure.
34
 In 2009, North Africa continued to attract large FDI inflows and was the continent‘s most 
diversified in terms of the allocation of FDI inflows. West Africa‘s FDI inflow continues to be dominated by oil 
industry expansion demands, with approximately 80 per cent of the region‘s FDI inflow obtained through the oil 
industry. In comparison, Central Africa saw the (resource-rich
35
) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) attract 43 
per cent of the region‘s FDI inflow. East Africa maintained its status as the lowest recipient of FDI inflow on the 
continent in 2009, whereas Southern Africa‘s FDI inflow level was boosted by Angola and SA, two of the top four 
FDI destinations on the continent.
36 
As can be seen from Table 4
37
 FDI inflow to Southern Africa increased by 
691.74 per cent over the ten-year period 2000-2009. There has, however, been little change in the proportion of 
FDI to Southern Africa going to Zambia: in 2000, Zambia accounted for 3.36 percent of Southern Africa's total 
FDI inflow, yet this percentage was remarkably similar at 3.82 percent in 2009. Zambia is ranking fourth in the list 
of SADC countries that receive the most FDI yearly. The number one FDI-receiving country is Angola, then 
South Africa and then the Seychelles. It can be concluded that although Zambia attracted much more FDI its 
attractiveness relative to its neighbouring countries has not changed significantly. This raises the question 
whether Zambia indeed became a more attractive FDI destination because of its economic reforms or if more 
general tendencies in the region mainly led to this increase of FDI inflows into Zambia.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
33
  Africa Economic Outlook. 2010. ―External Flows to Africa‖ [online] Available:  http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/outlook/external-
financial-flows-to-africa/direct-investment-inflows.html [25 July 2010] 
 
34
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2009. ―World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural 
Production and Development‖ New York and Geneva: United Nations Publication. 
 
35
 ‗Resource-rich‘ is a contested concept (the potential strategic use of this is further explained in footnote 103). Finding a good empirical 
definition of resource-rich is therefore challenging. Michaels (2010) argues that ―technology and demand affect the price of natural resources, 
changing the relative resource-abundance of different locations over time. Second, it is difficult to assess the physical quantity of 
economically extractable resources in many countries. Third, even if we could measure the price and quantity of natural resources, it is not 
clear whether we want to normalize our measure of resource abundance by gross domestic product (GDP) or by population‖ (2010:5). 
According to the definition of a ―resource-rich‖ country from the IMF‘s ―Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency‖ a country is classified as 
such on the basis of meeting either of the following criteria: (i) an average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral fiscal revenues in total fiscal 
revenue of at least 25 percent during the period 2000-2005 or (ii) an average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral export proceeds in total 
export proceeds of at least 25 percent during the period 2000-2005. See: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/051507g.pdf. However, 
this rather narrow definition of the IMF does not take into account other non-mineral natural resources such as gum or timber. For the 
purpose of this report we therefore suggest to define resource-rich countries that export any materials in their native or natural state which 
when exploited has economic value and of which the average share of its revenues in total fiscal revenues is at least 25 per cent.     
 
36
  Africa Economic Outlook. 2010. ―External Flows to Africa‖ [online] Available:  http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/outlook/external-
financial-flows-to-africa/direct-investment-inflows.html [25 July 2010] 
 
37
  See also Annex. 
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Table 4: Volume of FDI inflow per country in the SADC region, 2000-2009 (in USD million)   
 
        Year 
 
Country 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
Angola 879 2145 3133 5685 5606 6794 9064 9796 16581 13101 
Botswana 57 31 403 418 391 279 486 495 521 234 
DRC 72 80 141 391 409 … 256 1808 1727 951 
Lesotho 32 28 27 42 53 57 89 97 56 48 
Madagascar 83 93 61 95 95 86 294 777 1180 543 
Malawi 40 60 17 66 108 52 72 92 170 60 
Mauritius 277 -26 32 62 11 42 105 339 383 257 
Mozambique 139 255 347 337 245 108 154 427 592 881 
Namibia 186 365 181 149 226 348 387 733 720 516 
Seychelles 448 554 683 685 723 808 906 856 557 1114 
South Africa 887 6784 1569 734 798 6647 -527 5695 9006 5696 
Swaziland 106 29 92 -61 71 -46 121 37 106 66 
Tanzania 282 467 388 308 331 494 597 647 679 645 
Zambia 122 72 303 347 364 357 616 1324 939 959 
Zimbabwe 23 4 26 4 9 103 40 69 52 60 
Total 
Southern 
Africa 
 
3633 
 
10941 
 
7403 
 
9262 
 
8717 
 
9440 
 
12660 
 
23192 
 
33278 
 
25131 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2010. ―World Investment Report 2010: 
Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy‖ New York and Geneva: United Nations Publication. Statistics [Online] 
Available:  http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=4031.html [18 November 2010].  
 
As indicated above, both the origins of FDI as well as the proportion of the global FDI inflows to the continent 
have changed. The proportion of FDI inflow to Africa from developing countries has increased from an average 
of 17.7 per cent (1995-1999) to 20.8 per cent (2000-2008) of the total FDI inflow to the continent.
38
 African intra-
regional FDI tends to be smaller than that from overseas investors; notably African FDI is rarely directed to the 
main capital-intensive sectors, such as oil and extraction. In contrast, intra-African FDI has a stronger focus on 
services and manufacturing.
39 
At present, SA is the most important African source of intra-regional FDI for the 
continent, with countries in North Africa acting as other key investors from that region. The expansion of African 
financial institutions across the continent
40
, improving financial provision in Africa‘s economies and facilitating 
                                            
38
  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2010. ―Economic Development in Africa Report 2010: Making South-South Cooperation 
Work for Africa‖ in ECA Publications. Page: 138. 
 
39
   Africa Economic Outlook. 2010. ―External Flows to Africa‖ [online] Available:  http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/outlook/external-
financial-flows-to-africa/direct-investment-inflows.html [25 July 2010] 
 
40
   By the end of 2009, there were at least 18 banks of SSA origin (from South Africa, Nigeria, Mali, Botswana, Kenya, Cameroon, Mauritius 
and Togo) that had cross border operations in four or more countries. The drivers of the cross border expansion are many and often inter-
related, but the common ones are the declining opportunities in domestic markets and regulatory factors (Likonga & Chung 2010). 
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payment throughout the continent, contributes to the increase of African intra-regional FDI.  
2.3  Reasons for investing in Africa 
 
The last decade has seen a rise in interest from businesses, organisations and governments in systematic 
political risk analysis when embarking on foreign projects in Africa. This is to aid the necessary weighing up of 
opportunities against potential losses when deciding whether to proceed with such a venture in the region. This 
is because Africa does not appear an attractive destination for FDI for numerous reasons, as shall be outlined 
briefly. The amount of FDI inflows to the region is hampered by the traditional limitation of poor infrastructure in 
many African countries, combined with the relatively small size of Africa‘s domestic markets, which hinders 
business growth and efficiency. A further limitation is the perception by prospective foreign investors that the 
region has a large unskilled labour force. ―A high quality, productive, well-educated, skilled and disciplined labour 
force is what is required to help maintain the competitive edge of most MNCs in the global market place,‖
41
 thus 
the overall low level of education and skilled workers across the region acts as a deterrent for FDI inflows. 
 
Executives‘ attitudes towards the safety and profitability of foreign investment climates can largely be shaped 
and influenced by their own subjective perception of political instability: ―the possibility that political disequilibrium 
might result in governmental limitations on producing profits.‖
42
 For example, when considering undertaking 
business within Africa, countries and occasionally the region as a whole, have been eliminated from a business‘ 
investment consideration due to reasons based on political instability.  
  
However, by focusing on risks when assessing the political environment in Africa, prospective foreign investors 
are in danger of missing a substantial business opportunity. Both the government and businesses in the PRC 
have minimised this, by using the tool of forecasting, ―logically following an analysis of the identified variables in 
a risk model, determining their relationships and establishing their influence on a certain situation,‖
43
 in order to 
‗protect‘ and ‗weigh up the outcome‘ of their FDI in Africa. This follows along Howell and Chadwick‘s
44
 contention 
that the identification and forecasting of potential losses are integral when exploring possible, and to maintain 
current, avenues of FDI. Decision-makers in the PRC recognise the importance of dismissing the notion that risk 
is solely a negative concept: risk may imply positive as well as negative variation, meaning that the risk can 
result in gains, even if there is a probability of losses. This idea is expressed in the Chinese character for 'crisis' 
which contains both the word 'chaos' and 'opportunity'.  
 
                                            
41
  Abdulai, D. (2007). ―Attracting Foreign Direct Investment for Growth and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy Options and Strategic 
Alternatives‖ in Africa Development, Volume 32, Number 2, Page 13. 
 
42
  Brink, C. H. (2004). Measuring Political Risks: Risks to Foreign Investors. Ashgate Publishing: Aldershot, Page 19. 
 
43
  Hough, M. (2008). ―An Introductory Context of the Methodological, Conceptual, and Theoretical Framework of Risk Analysis‖ in Adar, K. 
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For example, starting up a business in a country that is perceived as a high risk country for FDI and therefore left 
alone by other investors, has the benefit of less competition and thus offers an attractive opportunity. The 
majority of Chinese FDI in Africa is ―concentrated in a few large, resource rich African countries characterised by 
high risk governance environments, and poor global competitiveness.‖
45
 The PRC is often criticised for 
concentrating the bulk of its investments on resource-rich countries. However, instead of focusing only on the 
resources, the combination with high risk government environments and therefore often less competition, should 
be considered as well as an important trigger for these Chinese investors.  
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3. FDI home countries’ profiles 
The previous section focused on general trends in FDI in the world and in Africa more specifically. It was pointed 
out that FDI from developed countries to Africa decreased in lieu of the global financial crisis, while FDI from 
emerging countries is proportionally rising. This section will zoom in on the strategies and the main actors/ 
institutions from the four main foreign investors to the SADC region in order get a better understanding of their 
different approaches and their subsequent different potential impacts on poverty reduction. 
3.1  United States 
3.1.1  Strategy and framework 
The US has long been the largest global recipient and investor of FDI
46
, and in 2009 the US maintained its status 
as the largest foreign investor abroad.
47 
US outward FDI is managed centrally within a specific framework under 
the Department of Commerce, with set government agencies overseeing the specificities concerning assisting 
and monitoring OFDI.
48
 In comparison, the US strategy for aid (USAID) is an independent federal government 
agency that receives overall policy guidance from the Secretary of State.
49
 Despite this separation in the US in 
outward FDI and ODA, there is the opportunity for US businesses to gain federal contracts and grants from 
USAID, which could lead to such businesses investing funding gained from USAID.
50
 Both OFDI and US ODA 
are heavily shaped by the foreign policy objectives of the US.
51
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The US is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that sets specific 
rules and regulations concerning, inter alia, the provision of development assistance to other countries and 
support for sustainable economic growth.
52 
This regulates the statistical coverage of aid and business projects 
the US embark; endeavours are not filed as FDI or ODA if the outcomes appear unlikely to meet the necessary 
OECD standards. 
 
Relative to the three other foreign direct investor countries focused on in this report, it can be stated that the US 
has by far the most comprehensive and up to date information and data available to the public concerning its 
outward FDI. 
3.1.2  Strategies for OFDI 
 
The broad strategy of the US concerning OFDI is to create new opportunities for US businesses in order to 
advance economic growth, jobs and opportunities for US citizens.
53
 Thus, US OFDI strives to be the most 
competitive and innovative in their particular field, whilst adhering to the international FDI rules and regulations of 
the multilateral (financial) institutions as mentioned. 
 
From a global outlook, the early 2000s saw an increase in FDI outflows from the US, reflecting a trend of 
continuing strong interest among US companies in expanding operations overseas.
54 
However, FDI outflow from 
the US has predominantly been Europe-centred
55
, and a strong trend has emerged showing that 70 per cent of 
US FDI is concentrated in high-income developed countries.
56
 In addition, the share of US FDI to developing 
countries overall has fallen in recent years. With regard to the actual amount of FDI outflow to the SADC region. 
OFDI by the US to the SADC region has increased by 263.26 per cent from 2000-2009. Looking specifically at 
Zambia, the US was home country of USD 95 million worth of FDI to Zambia in 2009, an increase of over 231.71 
per cent from 2000; thus slightly behind the average FDI increase to the SADC region as a whole.
57
 
 
The US and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) concluded a Trade, Investment and Development 
Cooperation Agreement (TIDCA) in July 2008, with the intention to ―use TIDCA as a forum to conclude a range 
of agreements on various trade facilitation issues and other areas of cooperation.‖ However, there is no common 
US OFDI strategy towards the SADC region as such. Instead key focus is placed upon using the politically stable 
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SA and Mauritius as gateways to the rest of the region. SA is recognised to have ―standards similar to those 
found in developed countries,‖ which has contributed to the US‘s significant investment in the country; the US 
stands as the second largest source of OFDI in SA following the UK.
58
 Moreover, Mauritius appears as one of 
the most successful and competitive economies in Africa. This attractive quality was influential in the 
implementation of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement which was signed between the US and 
Mauritius in 2006 further strengthening the bilateral relationship.
59
 
3.1.3  Institutions involved in US OFDI 
 
Within the US Department of Commerce, the International Trade Administration (ITA) agency aims to ―strengthen 
the competitiveness of US industry, promote trade and investment, and ensures fair trade through the rigorous 
enforcement of [US] trade laws and agreements.‖
60
 This is the key institution that works to help US businesses 
that wish to invest abroad, primarily through the US and Foreign Commercial Service Business Unit. Within this 
sub-unit, commercial support for US business interests worldwide is provided to help start businesses abroad or 
to increase sales in new global markets. The US and Foreign Commercial Service Business Unit is seen to be 
the trade promotion arm of the ITA. Services and information offered includes market intelligence, trade 
counselling, business matchmaking and trade advocacy (in order to ―level the international playing field for 
international procurement‖).
61
 In addition, three other business units within the ITA assist US FDI, namely:  
-  Manufacturing and Services, which aims to strengthen US competitiveness abroad by helping shape industry 
trade policy;  
-  Market Access and Compliance, which assists US companies and helps to create trade opportunities through 
the removal of market access barriers; and     
-  Import Administration, which enforces US laws and agreements in order to safeguard the competitive strength 
of US businesses and to prevent unfairly traded imports.
62 
 
 
Another important agency within the US Department of Commerce is the Economics and Statistics 
Administration (ESA), which produces analyses and disseminates economic and demographic data. One of the 
agencies overseen by the ESA is the Bureau for Economic Analysis (BEA), which is responsible for the US‘s 
economic accounts; this is where information concerning US FDI is organised managed and can be accessed.
63 
Furthermore, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS
a
) within the US Department of Commerce plays a role 
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concerning US FDI, as it works in partnership with the private sector in order to ensure that its security 
regulations ―do not impose unreasonable restrictions on legitimate international commercial activity that is 
necessary for the health of US industry.‖ The agency also aims to ensure that means to protect national security 
do not ―compromise the international competitiveness of the US industry without an appreciable national security 
benefits.‖
64
 
3.1.4  Strategies for Aid 
 
With regard to foreign aid as another strand of US foreign financial flows, the US Congress passed the Foreign 
Assistance Act in September 1961, which mandated the creation of an agency to administer economic 
assistance programmes. Thus, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) was set up in November 
1961 under overall direction of the US Secretary of State, in order to stand as a distinct, independent agency to 
undertake the US‘s aid obligations. USAID was set up as ―the first US foreign assistance organisation whose 
primary emphasis was on long-range economic and social development assistance efforts‖ and was not to be 
linked to political nor military functions.
65
 USAID was formed following a merger of various elements of the 
International Cooperation Agency, the Development Loan Fund, the Export-Import Bank and the Food for Peace 
programme of the Department of Agriculture, in order to combine economic, distribution and technical assistance 
of the prior dispersed US aid efforts.  
 
The structure of undertaking strategies for aid remains the same today
66
; USAID is ―an independent agency that 
provides economic development and humanitarian assistance around the world in support of the foreign policy 
goals of the US.‖
67
 However, despite being defined as independent, the strategies embarked on by USAID have 
the twofold purpose of furthering the US‘s foreign policy interests, concerning promoting democracy and free 
markets, whilst simultaneously aiming to improve the lives of citizens of the developing world; priorities, and 
hence programmes, differ according to the need of the respective region or country.
68
 The purpose of furthering 
the US‘s foreign policy interests is in sharp contrast to the US‘s aid strategy that, as noted above, ―was not to be 
linked to political nor military functions.‖ It indicates that ODA is a political and an economic tool for the US 
government.
69
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Besides USAID, initiatives and programmes have multiplied over the last years. The President‘s Malaria Initiative 
(PMI) is a key initiative led by USAID,
70
 and USAID plays a significant role in implementing the President‘s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) initiative.
71
 Although the US Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC) is seen to be an independent US foreign aid agency focusing on aid cooperation with the world‘s poorest 
countries, it is connected with USAID through the USAID Administrator serves on the MCC board.
72 
 
 
Looking specifically to Africa, USAID currently operates 23 bilateral missions on the continent, yet provides 
assistance to 47 countries. There are three regional missions: USAID/East Africa, USAID/Southern Africa, and 
USAID/West Africa, with key focus being placed upon strengthening democracy (to reduce the risk of conflict in 
the regions), strengthening regional economic linkages, mitigating food insecurity and reducing the risk and 
impact of the HIV/AIDS crisis.
73
 These priorities are also in place in Zambia, in addition to raising the quality of 
basic education and assisting agriculture-led economic growth to reduce rural poverty.
74
 
 
3.2  United Kingdom 
3.2.1  Strategy and framework  
The UK‘s strategy and framework concerning their investments have been shaped by the UK‘s history, most 
notably the colonial legacy left by the British Empire. The UK‘s foreign ministry is called Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO)
75
 and was created in 1968. It is a merger of the Foreign Office with the 
Commonwealth Office, the latter in itself being a merger of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations 
Office (in 1966). The FCO is still highly influential in determining strategy and framework of British investments, 
with the key non-ministerial department, UK Trade and Investment, having to report back to the FCO.  
 
The change in governmental departments illustrates the UK‘s desire to move away from colonial practices. Since 
1949 the UK has aimed to transform the colonial legacy of its member nations positively into strong economic 
and cultural partnerships based on nominal equality, choice and consensus.
76
 This quest has been embarked 
upon through the Commonwealth, previously known as the British Commonwealth, which strives to enhance the 
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ability of member states to work together in the common interest of their citizens for development, democracy 
and peace. The Commonwealth is made up of 54 independent states; all former British colonies - bar 
Mozambique and Rwanda, who joined the Commonwealth later. It is a voluntary membership and within the 
SADC region there are eleven members of the Commonwealth; Mozambique joined and Zimbabwe, at present, 
has left the organisation.
77
 Zambia and the UK share a colonial history and Zambia is among the Commonwealth 
countries.
78
 
 
The UK‘s strategy towards international financial flows (investment and aid) has shown to be dependent on the 
government in power. This can be illustrated by the clear move away from the previous Conservative 
government‘s approach by the Labour government to distinguish British aid from trade in The International 
Development Act of 2002. In addition, the Labour Government put less emphasis on the visibility of UK aid and 
rarely put the name or logo of the Department for International Development (DFID) on the initiatives they helped 
with (while still striving to communicate the involvement to the UK taxpayers).
79
 In comparison, since the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government has come into power in 2010, they have linked the 
spending of UK aid more closely to its visibility. The UK aid logo has become more prominent, with the intention 
of making it easier for recipients as well as UK taxpayers to see where the UK‘s aid budget is being spent and 
how it is being used to tackle global poverty. This potentially indicates a change in understanding of what 
‗ownership‘ by the partner government implies and thus might show a change in strategy.
80
 
3.2.2  Strategies for OFDI 
 
In 2009, the UK experienced USD 1,651,727 million worth of OFDI in total, nearly doubling the amount recorded 
in 2000; indicating that British companies recognise a number of benefits from investing abroad.
81
 For example, 
investing abroad results in less dependency on the UK economy, and there is evidence that the companies that 
have diversified their export portfolio have most effectively endured the recession. In addition, ―companies that 
trade internationally have more opportunities to increase their revenue and can charge a premium for their 
products and services,‖ whilst accessing a market with alternate niches from the UK‘s own.
82
 
 
Looking specifically to the SADC region, there is no common FDI strategy from the UK to this group of countries. 
In Angola, South Africa and Tanzania, there are specific United Kingdom Trade and Investment (UKTI) contacts 
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based in these countries to assist FDI from the UK; this is not the case for the remaining SADC states. The UK‘s 
choice in country focus can be explained by the economic relevance of the bilateral relationship: the annual 
exchange between South Africa and the UK was over USD 12 billion; the UK was the second largest foreign 
direct investor in Angola, with annual investments of over USD 3 billion; and the UK regarded Tanzania as an 
economy with opportunities, resulting in a steady rise in FDI from the UK over the past decade.
83
 
 
At present, there are ―no official services delivered on behalf of UKTI in [the Zambian] market to help British 
companies who wish to export or invest here,‖ which means that on a practical level no substantive commercial 
assistance is provided.
84
 Having said this, it is noted by UKTI that assistance can be granted to UK investors on 
a case-by-case basis, yet there are no channels set up to ease this process or to provide particular opportunities 
in Zambia. Despite there being no official services, the imports into the UK from Zambia in 2007 were worth USD 
32 million, comprising primarily trade in copper. UK exports to Zambia were measured at USD 56 million, 
showing the strength (and imbalance) of the Zambia-UK economic relationship.
85
 It is likely that UK investors 
face more challenges than their foreign direct investor counterparts who are granted specific assistance when 
investing in Zambia. Less assistance is arguably needed, however, given the countries‘ shared history. A strong 
cultural linkage exists, with many Zambians being Anglophiles. This linkage is further enhanced by most of the 
Zambian elite having gained their postgraduate education from the UK, acting as an advantage for UK 
companies to make and maintain good relations.
86
 
3.2.3  Institutions involved in UK OFDI 
 
The UK is renowned for being a strong trading nation with the British government traditionally providing 
important support for overseas British companies. This section explains the current institutions involved in the 
support of FDI outflow from the UK.
87
 The mandate of the UKTI is to provide a framework of support in order to 
help British companies succeed in the global economy.
88
 Thus, the UKTI provides practical support alongside 
expert advice to UK-based companies that wish to grow their business abroad. This department was initially 
formed in 1999 and was named British Trade International, with sub-departments of Trade Partners UK 
(concerning British export needs) and Invest UK (concerning inward investment to the UK). In 2003 these sub-
departments merged to become the UKTI, which was responsible for reporting jointly to the FCO and the 
Department for Trade and Industry (DTI). The DTI was replaced in 2007 by the creation of the Department for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, yet in 
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June 2009 these two departments were merged to create the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS
b
). Thus at present, the UKTI is responsible to the FCO and the BIS
b. 
 
Knowledge of overseas regulations and key information concerning business practice is provided by UKTI, in 
order to help identify opportunities and possible partner-venture organisations for UK companies.
89
 Further 
commercial, economic and political information required by business ventures can also be accessed from 
country profiles on the website of the British FCO. In addition, the Overseas Security Information for Business 
(OSIB) has been set up as a joint initiative between the FCO and UKTI, in order to provide UK businesses with 
up-to-date information concerning security risks faced when conducting business operations overseas. Country-
specific information is available for ninety countries and is free of charge to access.
90
 Similarly, the Defence and 
Security Organisation of the UK Trade and Investment department (UKTI-DSO) works closely with both the 
Ministry of Defence and the UKTI on matters concerning the export of defence and security equipment and 
services, acting as a ―co-ordinating focal point for companies in the security industry.‖
91 
The UKTI-DSO also 
engages closely with industry bodies, trade associations and UK regional International Trade Advisors (ITAs) to 
help ensure security for the business industry. More specifically, UK ITAs work alongside the UKTI-DSO to 
advise and guide UK companies on their route to export and help them to use the full range of UKTI-DSO 
services including in-country specialists.  
3.2.4  Strategies for Aid 
 
Following the Labour Party electoral victory in the UK‘s 1997 General Election, the aid programme was fully 
separated from the FCO, where it had previously been managed under the Overseas Development 
Administration section. DFID was set up as a new department headed by a Cabinet Minister, thus marking a 
turning point for the UK‘s aid programme. Fighting world poverty was DFID‘s explicit top priority, as opposed to 
the key focus being placed upon economic development as had been the case up until 1997.
92
 DFID published 
its first white paper focused on eliminating world poverty in August 1997; this was followed up in 2000, 2006 and 
2009 with the same message reinforced. The International Development Act of 2002 enshrined the sole purpose 
of aid spending as being poverty reduction, which arguably helped to place the link between aid and 
development higher on the national agenda. This Act also set the current aid strategy, ensuring British Aid 
cannot be linked to the provision of British goods and services (untying of aid).
93 
Among its key objectives, DFID 
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―set out to make global development a national priority and promote it to audiences in the UK and overseas, 
while fostering a new ‗aid relationship‘ with governments of developing countries.‖
94
 
 
DFID‘s work and projects depend on the varying needs of the specific host country, with the key mission to 
enhance poverty alleviation. DFID provided approximately USD 8.8 billion of aid to poorer countries in 2008/09, 
and have stated their budget to increase to approximately USD 12.5 billion in 2010/11 (despite severe impact of 
the financial crisis in the UK specifically and drastic budget cuts in other policy areas).
95
  
 
Looking specifically to Zambia, the UK is claiming to be the largest bilateral donor to Zambia, providing an 
average of approximately USD 58 million per year from 2007 to 2009, mainly in the form of general budget 
support to the Zambian government.
96 
The UK was unfortunately unable to provide a further breakdown of their 
OFDI per sector within neither Zambia nor the SADC region. 
 
3.3  China 
3.3.1  Strategy and framework  
 
On the one hand, the approach by China is to offer an alternative to the traditional donor-recipient relationship 
between African countries and the West. China‘s approach presents more scope for agency by African 
governments to play a larger role when negotiating investment deals, as deals with China are often struck 
between (or their implementation is subject to) government to government negotiations, as opposed to dealing 
with a multitude of private enterprises. On the other hand, Chinese companies are accused of not always 
meeting international requirements or standards, which can have a detrimental effect on poverty reduction if it 
reflects pay or working conditions for example. However, international requirements and regulations have been 
mainly influenced by institutions that were established by actors from the West
97
, and it can be argued that with 
the rise of emerging countries and a tendency towards a multi-polar world order, some of these international 
requirements and regulations may need revision.
98 
 
 
Chinese engagement is thereby often accused of undermining development strategies supported by Western 
countries to improve ‗governance‘
99
 on the African continent.
100
 These accusations are triggered by the approach 
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of China towards development cooperation that is in some important aspects different from the donor-recipient 
approach used by these traditional donors. In contrast to their British and American colleagues, Chinese 
government officials do not often use the word 'aid' for example. Chinese actors are rather referring to ‗economic 
cooperation‘, ‗development cooperation‘ or ‗investments‘. These words are chosen carefully by the Chinese 
government in order to distance its relations with the African countries from neo-colonial accusations.  
 
Chinese companies operating abroad have to apply to local law and regulations; however they also do have the 
risk to be taken accountable by the Chinese government. On 31 August 2006 the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
released a set of policy guidelines that serve ―to strengthen regulations in order to avoid conflicts.‖ These 
guidelines include six suggestions for Chinese overseas enterprises and organisations, and five suggestions for 
government agencies that authorise overseas projects (PRC-MC in Haglund 2008
101
). Haglund states that ―these 
may appear to be ―soft-regulations, in the sense that they make no references to specific laws. However the 
Ministry of Commerce suggestions and President Hu Jintao‘s subsequent pronouncements during his February 
2007 African tour, although not binding, have real implications for Chinese managers.‖
102
 
3.3.2  Strategies for OFDI 
 
In 2009, USD 56.529 million of global FDI originated from China.
103
 China was the fifth largest FDI source 
country in the world, the majority of which was invested in commercial services, mining, and finance sector. This 
brought Chinese FDI total stock to USD 245.75 billion; which was invested mainly in the finance, mining and 
retail sectors.
104
 However, Chinese FDI is still in its infancy: to compare, China‘s total FDI stock is only 1.3 per 
cent of the global FDI stock and far from the scale of investment of Western countries. A lack of international 
experience, management capacity and market share, combined with a lower proportion of overseas Chinese 
enterprises are mentioned as causing the gap between Chinese MNCs and those from the West.
105 
 
 
The ‗Go Out‘ or ‗Going Global‘ strategy initiated in 1999 by the Chinese Government is a strategy to encourage 
Chinese enterprises to invest abroad. This is significant because most nations focus on attracting FDI and are 
rather passive about OFDI. China is actively promoting both inward and outward foreign investment. The 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010) was clearly marked by strive to implement the ‗going out‘ strategy in 
its full. 
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During the launch of the Foreign Investment and Cooperation Development Report 2010 on November 1
st
 
2010
106
 the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) assured that there is no discrimination between SOEs and private 
enterprises in their policies. Explicitly, they denied that Chinese SOEs enjoy government subsidies. The role of 
Chinese SOEs is especially significant in Africa's extractive industries and Chinese private sector firms are now 
playing a substantial role in manufacturing.
107
 
 
China refers to ‗South-South cooperation‘ and developing ‗world solidarity‘ in its overseas engagements. Critics 
contest this by pointing to the fact that most of Chinese FDI is invested in ‗resource-rich‘ countries.
108
 Indeed, 
most Chinese investment is found in countries in Africa with an abundance of mineral resources.
109
 Yet, this is 
the common economic structure of most African economies, which are mainly based on trading raw materials 
instead of manufactured goods. Economies of countries with a lack of resources in Africa have often been 
stagnant and therefore not particularly attractive for foreign investors in general. It has to be noted, however, that 
the term ‗resource-rich‘ is subjective. Most often it is used to refer to countries with large oil reserves and mineral 
reserves such as gold, diamonds and copper. In this regard, Ethiopia cannot be regarded as resource rich. 
However, in the views of the Ethiopians themselves and the Chinese, Ethiopia is resource-rich because of the 
―rich resources of natural gum and incense‖ furthermore, the country it is considered to have the potential to 
become a sizeable market, due to its large population.
110  
    
 
Unfortunately, sectoral data on China‘s FDI flows to Africa at the aggregate level are only available for the period 
1979-2000 (UNCTAD 2007). 
3.3.3  Institutions involved in Chinese FDI 
 
Under the State Council (China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT)), the important axes of 
bureaucratic institutions involved in the management of outward FDI include:  
 the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC);  
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 Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM);  
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA);  
 the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC);  
 Ministry of Finance;  
 the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE); and 
 China‘s commercial banks and policy banks.
111
  
 
MOFCOM is the central entity through which all types of outward investments are directed. The tasks of 
MOFCOM are: to formulate development strategies, guidelines and policies of domestic and foreign trade and 
international economic cooperation; to draft laws and regulations governing domestic and foreign trade, 
economic cooperation and foreign investment; and to devise implementation rules and regulations. MOFCOM 
approves Chinese companies to invest in and set up overseas establishments (excluding financial companies) 
and supervises their operation. MOFCOM thereby emphasises the need to integrate with the local community 
and build up good relationships and be respectful.
112
 They are responsible for China's foreign economic 
cooperation efforts, to work out administrative measures and specific policies guiding China‘s overseas 
investment.  
 
Two departments within MOFCOM stand out in governing China‘s OFDI. One is the Department of Foreign 
Economic Cooperation (DFEC), which is responsible for regulating all Chinese OFDI and Chinese overseas 
labour corporations. All Chinese enterprises with FDI exceeding USD 10 000 are required to register with DFEC 
before investing abroad. This unit in MOFCOM can impose fines on or revoke overseas investment licences of 
violators of Chinese laws and relevant regulations. The other department is the office of the Economic and 
Commercial Counsellor (ECC), which is usually stationed at and administratively subject to Chinese embassies 
or consulates abroad, delegated by MOFCOM to monitor Chinese firms‘ foreign investment activities. 
 
As part of its efforts to restructure SOEs, the Chinese government has established SASAC in April 2003, which 
develops China's equity exchange market, while supporting Chinese foreign investments. It was established with 
the mandate of turning the country‘s top SOEs under its control into 50 global MNCs that feature on the global 
Fortune 500 list. SASAC has the authority to manage overseas state-owned assets; to decide whether and what 
acquisitions and mergers they can pursue; and to whether and in what percentage they should pay dividends to 
the government. 
 
Chinese firms have to apply to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) under the central bank, 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) for their foreign exchange. The PBC has been empowered to hold and manage 
the state‘s foreign exchange and gold reserves; make payment and settlement rules in collaboration with 
relevant departments; monitor money-laundering related or suspicious fund movement; and participate in 
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international financial activities at the behest of the central bank. Under the central bank, the SAFE is 
responsible for promulgating regulatory measures governing foreign exchange transactions under current 
account, supervising and monitoring foreign exchange transactions under capital account, including inward and 
outward remittance and payments, and providing the PBC with propositions and references for the formulation of 
exchange rate policy.
113
 
 
Each company which wants to invest overseas must get regulatory approval, but in 2003 MOFCOM and SAFE 
introduced a programme that allowed overseas investments of less than USD 3 million to be approved at the 
provincial government level rather than through the lengthy and complicated process of applying to Beijing. As a 
result of making it easier to invest abroad, in the first 11 months of 2003, Chinese companies invested 92 per 
cent more in offshore acquisitions and mergers than in the same period in 2002, according to MOFCOM 
statistics. This figure only included deals registered through the ministry and thus the actual rise in investments 
to be much higher.
114
 It is thereby important to note that while the Chinese government encourages Chinese 
companies to invest, it does not provide tax breaks for those companies who invest abroad.
115 
 
3.3.4  Strategies for Aid 
 
As explained, Chinese government officials rarely distinguish between 'aid' and investments. The same central 
institution that organises all other kinds of foreign investments, namely MOFCOM, also supports and regulates 
the Chinese investments that would, following the OECD definition, fall under ODA. Chinese officials rarely do 
refer to ODA, yet the frequency appears to be increasing. According to the newly established China Africa 
Research Institute of MOFCOM for example, the first example of Chinese ODA to Africa stems from 1963 to 
Algeria. During that year a Chinese medical team was sent to Algeria. Since then China has sent approximately 
45 medical teams over the world.
116 
Other forms of Chinese ODA to Africa are grants and preferential loans.  
 
China‘s policy has stated to not interfere in a country‘s domestic situation. What seems to be meant is that 
cooperation is conducted with all governments in Africa, irrespective of their ideological orientation or their 
governance record. This principle of ‗non-interference‘ has been central to Chinese cooperation with African 
countries.  
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3.4  South Africa 
3.4.1  Strategy and framework   
 
South Africa has a special position in this research since it is both an FDI home country and a receiver of FDI 
and it also a member of SADC. It is therefore not really a ‗foreign‘ investor to the SADC region, even though it is 
a foreign investor to Zambia. Prior to1994, South Africa‘s foreign policy within Africa focused primarily on the 
Southern African region - promoting a combination of economic interests, in the form of flows of South African 
exports and investments to the region, and military destabilisation as part of the aggressive defence of 
apartheid.
117
 The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the forerunner of SADC, 
was formed in 1980 with the explicit aim of reducing regional dependence on South Africa, and increasing the 
latter‘s isolation. Thus, the main focus of SADCC was on developing transport and communications 
infrastructure networks, surpassing South Africa as the main actor within the region. With the end of the 
Apartheid regime in 1994 the South African policy towards the Southern African region altered in accordance 
with the new political realities of the country. At this point, South Africa prioritised its need to enhance domestic 
growth and employment creation, thus recognising the possible benefits to be gained from increased trade and 
investment flows from South Africa to SADC and the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa.
118 
 
 
South Africa formally acceded to the SADC Treaty in August 1994 after Apartheid was abolished. In terms of 
strategy to the SADC region, South Africa aspires for closer collaboration and economic integration via the 
establishment of a free trade area in the region, the development of basic infrastructure and the development of 
human resources.
119
 This has taken place via a range of South African private and public actors investing 
relevant resources in the region.
120
 As a result of the country‘s history and the need to address issues of 
economic and social development at both regional and continental level, South Africa‘s engagement with other 
African countries can be found to centre on three pillars:  
 strengthening Africa‘s institutions;  
 supporting implementation of Africa‘s socioeconomic development programme, the New Partnership for 
Africa‘s Development (NEPAD); and  
 improving bilateral political and socioeconomic relations through dialogue and cooperation with other 
African countries.
121 
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South Africa‘s FDI advancement into Africa has many different dimensions, covering large-scale corporate as 
well as parastatal projects. South African FDI also includes the engagement of South African small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) across the border in neighbouring countries.
122
 While most South African OFDI is dominated 
by large private enterprises, SOEs and SMEs have also contributed to corporate internationalization. Historical 
ties, competition at home and from abroad, the ‗financial rand system‘,
123
 attractiveness of overseas markets and 
liberalization played a key role in driving South African OFDI strategies to the region. Access to natural resources 
has also led South African companies (both large and SMEs) to invest abroad to secure supplies.
124 
South 
African parastatal organisations have also participated in South Africa‘s cross-border investment activities such 
as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA), providing 
finance to a variety of sectors and acting as levers for South African and international investment in host 
countries.
125 
 
3.4.2  Strategies for OFDI 
 
The South African financial rand system was abolished with effect from 13 March 1995.
126
 Since then one of the 
key strategies has been the selective easing of exchange controls that has been used to encourage outward 
investment first to Southern Africa, specifically the SADC countries, and then to the rest of Africa. In March 1997, 
the Government relaxed exchange controls and South African firms were allowed to invest up to USD 4.4 million 
abroad, with an additional USD 3 million for investment in SADC member countries.
127
 This was followed by 
further relaxation in subsequent years allowing South Africa-resident firms to invest up to USD 36.5 million per 
approved investment in the SADC region.
128
 This has given greater scope for South African investments in the 
region as well as the African continent. The flood of South African products to the region had both positive and 
negative impacts on the local economies of these neighbouring countries. On the one hand, South African 
companies created a revival of the retail market in Zambia for example; however, on the other hand it created an 
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aggressive image of South African companies and locals complain that South African companies take away 
business from them.  
 
Recently, challenges to investment in SADC have begun to include competition as there has been an increase in 
the saturation of market opportunities in the region. Because of the saturation of market opportunities in the 
region a substantial shift of South African FDI into the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting the change in OFDI 
strategy from South African institutions.
129 
Also, South African SMEs have faced constraints in going abroad 
because of the lack of access to finance and market information, and concern over the additional risk of 
operating in an unfamiliar environment, thus trade-supporting motives and market access have been on the 
increase in South African OFDI arrangements strategy.
130
 This has further come about due to the sizeable intra-
Africa investments made by South African companies in recent years. The country has hence become 
concerned with investments being safeguarded, including questions surrounding the appropriate model for 
agreements, bilateral or regional, that contemplate South Africa‘s OFDI.
131
 
 
South Africa has five Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with countries in the SADC region (Mozambique, 
Mauritius, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and the DRC). Typical clauses in South Africa‘s BITs revolve around the scope of 
an investment, definition of investment and investor, geographic application of the agreement, duration and 
termination, standards of treatment (national treatment and Most Favoured Nation – MFN), expropriation, 
transfer of funds and dispute resolution. South African OFDI and trade with Southern African countries, and 
associated development of investment regulations, are further mirrored in development of regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) and deeper forms of integration. RTAs are important complements to investment since they 
allow goods to flow relatively freely to and from subsidiaries located in foreign locations that are part of the RTA, 
and as such promote a favourable investment climate. South African OFDI into Southern Africa has been aided 
by the two RTAs that South Africa is part of: the SACU and SADC. Unlike BITs which largely offer protection 
clauses, the SACU agreement and SADC‘s Trade Protocol cover not only free movement of goods but also 
mooted competition policies, proposed liberalisation of FDI in services, proposed harmonisation of broader 
property rights and contract enforcement, provide access to a large market and stable and predictable trade 
policies. In 2006 the FIP was approved by SADC with the goal to establish the legal base for cooperation 
concerning macroeconomic, finance and investment policy. This will be explained in more depth in section 4. 
However, despite the protocol being certified in 2007, SADC has struggled to put a definite structure in place. 
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3.4.3  Institutions involved in South African FDI 
 
The financing strategy of South African OFDI differs by types of institutional investor. The lion's share of the 
private non-banking sector's OFDI activities are financed through reinvested earnings, while the banking sector 
prefers using equity capital and the SOEs through other capital such as intra-company loans. The different 
financing strategies reflect the different degree of extensiveness and exposure of the different types of 
institutions to internationalisation and the influence of government regulations on raising corporate finance 
abroad.
132
 The private sector, particularly the banking sector, dominates South African OFDI flows. Given the 
large volume of portfolio inflows into South Africa from the rest of the world, it may be that those inflows are 
recycled into FDI outflow into the region; in other words it is possible that South Africa‘s sophisticated financial 
markets are being used to channel resources across Africa.
133
 
3.4.4  Strategies for Aid  
 
Development assistance in South Africa prior to 2000 originated with the apartheid regime trying to support 
several African countries such as Lesotho, Gabon, Cote d‘Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, and Comoros. Development 
assistance fell largely under the Economic Co-operation Promotion Loan Fund Act, 1968 (as amended by the 
Economic Co-operation Promotion Loan Fund Amendment Act, 1986), and was also used to offer support to the 
so-called ―Homelands‖ in South Africa.
134 
Institutionally, this support was granted through the Development 
Assistance Programme, which was situated in a Chief Directorate in the Department of Foreign Affairs. The 
programme consisted of direct project-related development assistance, administered by the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa (DBSA). The Development Assistance Programme continued to operate after the first 
democratic elections of 1994, but no longer included assistance within South Africa, as the ‗Homelands‘ were 
reincorporated into South Africa following the transition to democracy. As the foreign policy context in South 
Africa changed with the onset of democracy, the country no longer tied its development assistance.
135
 Thus at 
the end of 2000, the programme was replaced by the current African Renaissance and International Co-
operation Fund, also known as the African Renaissance Fund (ARF).
136
 The fund is managed by the Department 
of Foreign Affairs (renamed the Department of International Relations and Cooperation in 2009) in cooperation 
with the National Treasury.
137
 South Africa is committed to SADC and regional cooperation in Africa and is active 
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in mobilising international development finance for the continent. South Africa is also active in providing 
development support to a range of countries in the region beyond the African Renaissance Fund. As an 
example, in the DRC a range of South African government departments and agencies – under the auspices of 
the bi-national commission between the two countries – are working together with their counterpart institutions 
on a range of development projects.
138
 South African aid is currently at an early stage in developing its own 
institution for delivering aid to other developing countries, envisaged to be called SADPA, South African 
Development Partnership Agency; the ARF is expected to be the core of a proposed new facility. 
 
3.5 Similarities and differences between FDI source countries 
 
The study has found a number of commonalities and differences in state management of FDI from China and 
other countries which are reflected in the flow diagrams in the Annex of this report. For example, the way 
investments from Chinese companies are supported by the well-organised Ministry of Commerce shows 
similarities with the support companies from the UK get from the British government. This however is quite 
different from the American companies who invest more on their own initiative with less support from their 
government. Although the ODA policy of the US actively promotes market reforms in developing countries and 
thereby create indirectly better investment opportunities for American companies. South African companies, for 
their part, receive shattered support from many different Ministries and Departments within their government.  
 
Chinese and South African investors seem to share a long-term perspective on establishing and nurturing good 
relationships with the FDI host countries. For the South African companies a long-term strategy is seen as useful 
and necessary since they are operating within their own region and they do not want to lose opportunities in the 
nearest markets for them. A representative of the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
mentioned in an interview: ―we don‘t see ourselves growing unless the rest of Africa is growing as well. Our 
destiny is intertwined.‖
139
 However, South African companies still have to work on their negative image in the 
region since Apartheid and the flood of African products into the regional markets right afterwards. The Chinese 
approach towards long-term business relations is mainly based upon norms and values within Chinese business 
culture, especially the principle of Guanxi. Another difference is that South African investors seem to connect 
more on the level of the local community
140
 while Chinese investors typically focus on their relations with the host 
government.
141 
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An important distinction among the four chief investors in the region is the way in which FDI is differentiated from 
other international financial flows, such as Official Development Assistance (ODA). Generally speaking, the first 
priority of FDI from the private sector from any home country is to generate a benefit for the investor, while 
official aid has a range of motivations (inter alia: international solidarity, global public goods, foreign policy 
concerns). In ODA, the international consensus is that poverty reduction should be the paramount aim. The UK, 
for instance, differentiates between ODA and FDI; the former is regulated via a separate central entity, the 
Department for International Development (DFID), whilst in China, no sharp distinction is made between ODA 
and FDI, and both are regulated by the same Ministry, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). According to 
Chinese business culture, business deals are meant to be beneficial for all parties involved in order to ensure 
that all parties involved are committed.   
 
Following the financial crisis of 2008/9, Chinese FDI to the SADC region has gained more significance. The 
effects of the overall dip in FDI flows to the region was overcome more quickly by the increasing volumes of 
Chinese FDI, which grew eighteen-fold from 2003 to 2009.
142
 Indeed, the relative importance of Chinese FDI to 
countries in SADC is rising. 
 
In short, there are obvious endeavours with all actors to support their companies to invest abroad, with the 
minimum effort being provision of information. There are, too, obvious linkages to the foreign policy agenda in all 
countries. Yet, there exist important differences between the main foreign investors as well. Chinese state 
enterprises are a different story to private companies and the distinction of ODA and FDI makes the institutional 
setting difficult to compare. Having assessed the differing procedures and factors in place concerning the 
outward FDI of these home countries, this report shall now proceed to explore the domestic strategies and 
regulations of SADC and Zambia. 
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4. Strategies and regulations to attract and 
manage FDI inflows 
 
4.1  SADC 
The Southern African Development Community states as its main goal the aspiration ―to form common political 
interests and support greater trade and investment flows between members.‖
143
 At present, SADC has 15 
member states.
144 
The SADC Treaty provides the legal basis for the SADC as an international organisation, in 
addition to certifying the key objectives, aspirations, and cooperation areas of its member states.
145
 SADC is 
illustrative of a bottom-up approach to governance, whereby the SADC member states play the key role in the 
region with the SADC Secretariat playing a ‗higher‘, but more advisory role. 
 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the SADC region performed relatively poorly with regard to attracting 
FDI.
146
 One of the reasons, for example, was that most current SADC member-states had a double-digit inflation 
rate in the 1990s, which was not favourable to investors.
147
 Numerous other reasons can be attributed to this 
state of affairs, including the small size of domestic markets, political instability and socio-economic issues, such 
as high levels of crime and corruption. In the face of increasing globalisation, SADC member-states have moved 
towards liberalising their economies and loosening the regulations concerning FDI,
148 
such as the move to 
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enable foreign investors to repatriate profits as shown presently in Zambia. SADC officially aspires to create one 
model whereby the movement and distribution of FDI would be seen as a harmonised investment regime by 
potential investors. In recent years various targets to increase the FDI attractiveness of the region have been set 
(see below). 
4.1.1  Strategies to attract FDI 
 
SADC‘s key document on attracting FDI is the FIP of 18
 
August 2006 acts ―as the tool for achieving regional 
integration through the harmonisation of financial and investment policies in the 15 member states.‖
149 
Moreover, 
it establishes the legal base for cooperation concerning macroeconomic, finance and investment policy. The FIP 
is of key significance as it commits member-states to: 
 
- Coordinate their investment regimes and to cooperate to create a favourable investment climate 
throughout the SADC. 
- Reduce divergences in macroeconomic aggregates among member states and commit them to 
converge on stability oriented economic policies. 
- Cooperate in taxation and related matters in order to facilitate trade and improve the investment 
climate, whilst strengthening tax administration to defer fraud and smuggling.
150
 
 
The FIP appears highly advantageous to both host region and foreign investor, providing a stabilising influence 
on SADC economies through cooperation in addition to making it easier for FDI to enter the region. A 
representative from SADC FIP stressed such measures would result in moving towards convergence, as 
opposed to overarching control. This would promote effectiveness with all countries reaching the minimum 
standards concerning FDI inflows; thus different member states achieving this through different rules is not 
considered a problem by SADC.
151 
 
 
Furthermore, the RISDP was passed during the SADC Summit in 2003, setting the following targets for SADC‘s 
regional integration: 
 
1) By 2008: An FTA whereby at least 85 per cent of goods are tariff free. 
2) By 2010: Completion of the negotiations of the Customs Union. 
3) By 2015: Completion of the negotiations of the SADC Common Market. 
4) By 2016: Implementation of a SADC Monetary Union and a SADC Central Bank. 
5) By 2018: Launching a regional currency.
152
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These targets are of significance for foreign investors, as elements of the RISDP incorporate strategies to attract 
FDI, as shall be shown in the analysis below. 
 
The FTA was officially launched in August 2008. At this point 85 per cent of import tariffs were removed from FTA 
member-states and it was attempted to reduce red tape and paperwork at borders. The overall aim of the FTA is 
to create a more advantageous environment for investment and trade. Twelve of the 15 member-states are 
currently members of the FTA, with Angola, the DRC and Seychelles set to join in the near future. The 
liberalisation of tariffs has taken place at differing rates over the past decade at the choice of the individual 
countries, providing that at least 85 per cent of trade in goods was free by 2008.
153 
This target was met and in 
2009 the FTA covered USD 380 billion in total GDP, which could potentially increase to USD 465 billion if the 
latter three countries do decide to join.
154 
 
 
The day-to-day monitoring of the FTA at a regional level is carried out by the Trade, Industry, Finance and 
Investment Directorate of the SADC Secretariat. The actual implementation, however, is primarily dependent on 
member-states themselves and the domestic structures that they have in place.
155
 Moreover, the rules of origin 
are rather broad and consequently, unlike most regional treaties, the FTA‘s benefits are not limited to the 
protocol‘s signatories; the majority of goods that originate in a SADC member-state qualify for duty free access 
to the SADC market. Thus, as long as the goods are ―produced or manufactured in a member state using 
materials from within the region,‖ businesses ―use only the imported inputs to rear or grow agricultural products,‖ 
and/or the ―working of a product into a new one that is significantly different‖ from the imported original occurs, 
the goods will account as originating within a SADC FTA member-state.
156
 This is a significant strategy by SADC 
that does not discriminate against local or foreign investors in the region, potentially including also investments 
from European and Chinese enterprises in Southern Africa.  
 
SADC has recognised its need to become a more visible investment destination, contributing to the September 
2009 launch of its ‗SADC 2010‘ investment promotion program, which aims to raise the visibility of SADC both 
regionally and internationally. This is reflective of SADC‘s strategy to place their key focus on attracting 
measurable sustainable FDI as a region, as opposed to individual member-states attracting FDI separately.
157
 
The 2010 CAF African Cup of Nations and the 2010 FIFA World Cup hosted in 2010 by two SADC member-
states, Angola and SA respectively, were in lieu of the ‗One Team, 15 Nations‘ theme granted to this program.
158
 
Within this promotion program, SADC projects itself as ―an invaluable investment partner‖ before asserting its 
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current targets in the form of identifying projects that need public-private sector investments.
159 
The vast 
opportunities spanning the sectors of tourism, infrastructural development and services, trade and industry are 
highlighted, alongside the ―natural endowments in minerals, oil, abundant raw materials and value addition.‖
160 
Within this program, SADC has identified investment opportunities concerning a range of topics: Spatial 
Development Initiatives and Transport Corridors; Regional Strategic Water Infrastructure; Energy Infrastructure, 
Boundless Southern Africa; and Information and Communications Technology.
161
 
4.1.2  Perceived attractiveness of the investment climate in SADC 
 
The IMF has identified that ―one of the least noticed aspects of the global economic downturn has been the 
resilience of the sub-Saharan Africa region,‖ noting its brief slowdown in comparison with other regions of the 
world.
162 
However, Africa does not appear an attractive destination for FDI due to an amalgamation of socio-
economic and political aspects. This is also true for the SADC region. Cultural aspects have also been found to 
play a role, but on an individual member-state level rather than the SADC as a whole. 
 
Focusing first on socio-economic aspects, the volume of FDI inflows to the SADC region is hampered by the 
relatively small size of Africa‘s domestic markets, combined with the traditional limitation of poor infrastructure 
and high communication costs in many African countries. This hinders business growth and efficiency, whilst also 
substantially increasing the costs of doing business in the region.
163 
A further limitation is the perception by 
prospective foreign investors that the SADC region has a large unskilled labour force. ―A high quality, productive, 
well-educated, skilled and disciplined labour force is what is required to help maintain the competitive edge of 
most MNCs in the global market place,‖
164 
thus the overall low level of education and skilled workers across the 
SADC region acts as a deterrent for FDI inflows.  
 
Assessing the potentially obstructive political aspects of SADC‘s business environment, executives‘ attitudes 
towards the safety and profitability of foreign investment climates are also shaped and influenced by their 
perception of the region‘s wider political (in)stability.
165
 When considering undertaking business in the SADC, the 
region may be eliminated from a business investment consideration due to reasons based on political instability 
in one or more of the member-states. For example, policy uncertainty, policy contradictions, high crime levels 
and corruption have been highlighted as areas of significant constraint to attracting FDI in SADC.
166
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4.1.3  The role of FDI in the economy of SADC 
 
Despite the large number of member-states, the SADC market is still relatively small by international standards 
due to, amongst other factors, the overall comparatively small population size, standing at 257 million in 2009. 
This means there is substantial room for foreign investors.
167
 Further regional economic integration in the SADC 
―is geared towards creating larger markets with a favourable business and investment climate aimed at 
achieving economic growth and, ultimately, improving the lives of the citizens in the region.‖
168
 Thus, the 
important link between a favourable investment climate that can attract increased FDI and the subsequent 
improvements in living standards for SADC citizens is recognised by the SADC.  
 
At present, there is very little information concerning whether FDI has actually contributed to poverty reduction in 
the SADC region as it has not been monitored at this regional level.
169 
Moreover, the policies implemented over 
the past few years, such as the FIP, FTA and SADC 2010, are relatively young and their impacts are hard to 
conclude to date. Ultimately, the FDI in the region should spark economic growth, which in turn the SADC 
Secretary believes will lead to ―higher real incomes for SADC citizens, and a convergence in living standards 
whereby citizens enjoy the benefits of an economy that propels them towards higher income levels,‖ showing 
their positive outlook.
170
 
 
Looking specifically to the FTA as an example, one of the objectives is the ―ultimate benefit of the citizens and 
residents of the SADC region and those with whom they conduct trade, business and investment outside of the 
region,‖ showing recognition of the benefits for citizens of the region in addition to domestic and FDI.
171
 This 
report recognises that although comparatively small by international standards, as of 2009 the breadth of the 
SADC FTA encompasses 170 million people that can benefit from this policy.
172
 The most prominent benefit for 
the region as a result of increased FDI attracted by the FTA is expected to be a more competitive and vibrant 
private sector in SADC. In turn, this will create more employment in the region as a result of the new FDI and the 
expansion of current foreign investor products, and lower prices for businesses and households.
173 
As a result of 
lower barriers to trade the FTA could increase FDI competition in the region. This is expected to help reduce 
poverty in the region through key consumption goods becoming more affordable, attributed to enhanced 
competitiveness, which will see SADC citizens being able to gain better value for money concerning goods and 
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services.
174
 In conclusion, it is expected that the knock-on effects of lower tariffs and increased intra-regional 
competition introduced by the FIP, FTA and SADC 2010 have a positive effect on poverty reduction, yet it 
appears too early to conclude on their impact to date other than to note their full benefits have not yet been felt. 
4.1.4 Regulations to manage FDI and reap the benefits 
 
As noted, SADC follows a bottom-up approach to governance, whereby member-states play the key role in the 
region with the SADC Secretariat fulfilling more advisory and facilitative tasks. Looking at the strategies agreed 
by SADC to attract FDI, it can be seen that the implementation of the FIP has also taken on this bottom-up 
approach, with much work being undertaken prior to its official approval, due to the need for agreement among 
member-states over a series of Memoranda of Understandings (MOUs) related to economic integration. This 
bottom-up approach was highlighted to be beneficial on the grounds that it enabled consensus-building and saw 
to the MOUs starting to be implemented even before it was finalised, with them consequently being incorporated 
into the Annexes to the FIP.
175
 
 
However, a member of SADC FIP stated his belief that the ‗bottom-up‘ structure of the SADC can be seen to limit 
SADC‘s management of FDI and its benefits, as FDI levels are determined by individual member-state countries.  
Despite the FIP being finalised and signed by member-states in August 2006, in reality there is no common 
strategy concerning managing FDI at present. As of October 2010, SADC has not collated or analysed any data 
on SADC‘s FDI, and this task is still solely being carried out by member-states individually. Instead, SADC is in 
the process of collating data identifying different member-states‘ investment regimes and trying to find out what 
the status quo of the region is with regard to FDI. SADC concedes that despite the protocol being certified in 
2006, the organisation has struggled to put a definite structure in place for FDI inflows in order to reap the 
benefits.
176
 Thus, this advantageous environment for foreign investors and member-states alike presented in the 
FIP is not apparent at present.  
 
Similarly, this report concludes that a key weakness concerning the management of FDI through the FTA is the 
subsequent reliance on member states to implement the strategy, without effective enforcement recourse by the 
regional organisation. A key informant at the ZDA noted that they still receive many complaints from foreign 
investors in the region who do qualify for the regional FTA benefits, yet still experience a high cost of doing 
business in SADC. High tariffs and border controls concerning goods were stated to be problematic, which 
should not be the case with the FTA being in place. This suggests that the possible benefits from FDI are not 
being maximised due to the lack of management of the FIP and FTA at a member-state level causing the region 
to appear less attractive an FDI destination. 
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SADC has implemented a form of regulation for projects to ensure that projects are bankable and attractive to all 
stakeholders. Thus, the Project Preparation and Development Facility has recently been introduced, under the 
guidance of the SADC Regional Development Fund. The latter provides the funds and technical assistance 
necessary for project identification and selection and for the carrying out of feasibility studies. This appears to be 
an initiative which will help SADC manage and reap the rewards from FDI, yet the facility only became 
operational during the middle of 2010, and thus its effectiveness is yet to be evaluated.  
4.1.5  Key points by stakeholders for improvement of FDI climate 
 
There is recognition that in the SADC region member countries can learn from one another for the benefit of 
making the region more attractive for FDI. The SADC Secretariat can learn lessons from the increasing FDI 
inflows in some member -states and, using this knowledge, suggest adaptations to other member-states in order 
to make them more attractive for FDI.
177
 Mauritius can be used as a good example of maximising its FDI 
potential. As a small island state, it has limited investment possibilities to offer.
178
 However, the government of 
Mauritius made the education system a key focus in their domestic policy. Mauritius established a well-educated 
and skilful work force with strong language skills in both French and English. Based on this, Mauritius attracts 
FDI by promoting itself as an ideal hub from which foreign investors can branch into SADC. This approach aims 
to attract FDI to the SADC region as a whole, with the Mauritian expertise, high education levels and cultural 
linkages with the region, put forward to attract consultancy positions in FDI projects in the SADC region.
179
 It is of 
course implausible for all countries in the region to aspire to become hubs. However, a representative of the 
Embassy of Mauritius to South Africa made a comparison with South-East Asia and explained that Indonesia 
needed the rest of the region to grow in order to develop its own economy. Therefore, he claimed that the 
aspiration of Mauritius to create a favourable environment to attract FDI and to educate and specialise the 
workforce in order to increase the attractiveness of the region.   
 
Currently, eight of the 15 SADC member-states are also member states of Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), which raises questions and concerns over the enforceability of SADC‘s FTA. It can 
also limit the benefits accessible by foreign investors. Ultimately, SADC is integrating the economies of its 
member-states with those of COMESA and the EAC, into a single large market, yet the specific amalgamation of 
rules and regulations which will be applied to this larger region have yet to be considered.
180
 SADC needs to 
issue an official stand on whether the CRIAs or the SADC‘s FTA rules should be adhered to by the eight SADC 
member-states that are members of both agreements. 
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In terms of FDI policy, substantial improvements have been made over the past twenty years, yet stakeholders 
on the ground argue there is still much to be achieved as the FIP and FTA are not being fully implemented in 
member-states.
181 
Recommendations for how SADC can better attract FDI remain focused on the need to 
reduce the costs of doing business.
182 
Despite the FTA being underway, it is not being managed effectively by 
either SADC or the individual member-states, resulting in the benefits not being experienced by investors. It has 
been suggested that SADC is limited in its capabilities to manage FDI due to its bottom-up approach;
183
 it has 
even been put forward that a move to grant SADC more power as an overarching body similar to the European 
Union (EU) may be preferential.
184 
 
  
Despite the FIP being in place, there is still the call for a coordinated market approach to attract FDI
185
 and for 
the movement and distribution of FDI to be undertaken as a harmonised investment regime,
186
 indicating that 
despite the promising strategy, the current framework in place is not strong enough. Thus, this report concludes 
that although the FIP is a laudable development, at present it suffers from institutional weakness that threatens 
its efficacy as a vehicle for integration of financial services in the region. In theory the FIP and timeline for 
regional economic integration in the SADC does increase the attractiveness of the investment climate of SADC, 
yet these strategies are not being fully implemented due to the limited capacity of SADC which further hinders 
the ability of SADC to attract and manage FDI. 
 
4.2  Zambia 
 
Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa that covers a total area of 752,618km, making it the 39
th
 
largest country in the world. Considering its size, Zambia is comparatively sparsely populated: it has the 69
th
 
highest population figure in the world; in July 2010, Zambia‘s population stood at approximately 13.5 million.
187
 
The country‘s wealth in mineral resources, including copper and cobalt, combined with major investments in 
infrastructure and manufacturing from 1964-1971 by the government, resulted in a successful economy following 
independence. During this period, in April 1968, the Zambian government started the Mulungushi Economic 
Reforms: a process of nationalisation across the country which picked up pace in the early 1970s. However, the 
significant global rise in oil prices in 1973 followed by the slump in copper prices in 1975 had a detrimental 
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impact on the Zambian economy
188
. In 1973 the price of copper had accounted for 95 per cent of Zambia‘s 
export earnings, yet the worldwide crisis in 1975 saw copper‘s value halve, resulting in Zambia experiencing a 
balance of payments crisis and becoming increasingly in debt to the IMF
189
. Being heavily indebted, the Zambian 
Government had no other choice than to seriously reform the economy.  
 
During the 1990s, Zambia‘s economic growth was well below the SADC average of one percent and the Sub-
Saharan African average of 2.4 percent, even following the Zambian Government‘s attempts to stabilise the 
country‘s economy.
190
 Under close guidance from the IMF and World Bank further reforms were made: price 
controls were removed; the exchange rate was unified and became market-determined; capital controls were 
abolished; interest rates on loans were liberalised; and regular auctions of treasury bills were initiated. 
Agriculture input and output markets were also opened up to private sector entry, and import controls were 
abolished with very few exceptions. The reforms were drastic and the privatisation process moved fast. By 2002, 
almost all the parastatal companies were privatised.
191
  
4.2.1  Strategies to attract FDI 
 
Since the mid-2000s, Zambia has enacted a number of reforms meant to foster economic development and 
impacting on the investment climate of the country. On 31
st
 December 2006, five Zambian authorities merged 
into a new institution that was meant to induce economic development - the ZDA.
192 
This institution has been set 
up to further economic development by formally promoting efficiency, investment and competitiveness in 
business. The ZDA compiles data on investment commitments from investors who obtain investment licences 
from the ZDA. Mining investors however do not invest through the ZDA, but instead work with the Ministry of 
Mines and Mineral Development. The ZDA‘s data is therefore incomplete, as it does not show the total FDI flows 
or stocks and should not be considered a complete measure of investment.
193 
 
 
The ZDA is mandated to promote exports in order to create wealth, jobs and enhance economic development. In 
addition, the ZDA Act 11 of 2006 provides for the encouragement of investment in Zambia by way of special tax 
incentives, which are valid for a period of five years. In order to qualify for such an incentive, a firm or investor 
must invest a minimum of USD 500,000 in one of Zambia‘s key sectors. These key sectors are agriculture; 
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manufacturing; infrastructure; education; health; water and sanitation; and public order and safety.
194 
These 
focus areas are utilised in many settings to guide the planning and development of the country in line with the 
diversification policy, in order to reduce dependency on the mining sector as Zambia‘s only economic 
foundation.
195
 
 
Zambia is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which guarantees foreign 
investment protection in cases of war, disasters, strife, disturbances, or expropriation.
196
 Furthermore, Articles 
16(1) of the Constitution and 35(1) and (2) of the ZDA Investment Act provide protection of investment projects. 
In accordance with the above, no property or interest in right over property can be compulsorily acquired, except 
for public purposes, under an Act of Parliament and against prompt compensation payment. The Investment Act 
also guarantees investors the right to transfer funds abroad.
197
 These are positive steps towards establishing 
investor confidence and improving Zambia‘s attractiveness as an investment destination in SADC.  
4.2.2  Perceived attractiveness of the investment climate 
 
Another international dimension that affects FDI inflow to Zambia are reports issued by multilateral 
organisations, such as the World Bank
198
, and their rankings concerning the investment climate of the respective 
country or region. Potential investors, especially from the West, can be expected to consider these rankings 
when making a decision about whether or not to invest in a sector of the Zambian economy if investment could 
also be made elsewhere in the region.
199
 Therefore, it could be argued that reports of these multinational 
organisations are not just reporting on, but – to some extent – are also influencing FDI inflows. The ranking in 
investment climate has overall improved for Zambia in the past years, which could be expected to result in 
increased investors‘ interest. Zambia climbed up eight positions from last year‘s ranking, now appearing 76
th
 out 
of 183 economies in the world for ease of undertaking business in the country.
200
 This improvement will be noted 
by possible investors when weighing up options for where next to invest overseas – or at least when considering 
choices on where to base investment in the region. 
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From a socio-economic perspective, Zambia appears to be an attractive FDI destination: the economic reforms, 
tax incentives and other regulations put in place to attract FDI opened up the Zambian market and made it a 
more attractive FDI destination. This is visible in the increase of FDI inflows: from 2000-2004 FDI inflows 
increased by 274 percent to USD 334 million.
201
 Due to a change in regulation investors can now take 100 
percent of their profits out of the country back to their home country.
202
 In addition, the Bank of Zambia (the 
country‘s central bank) maintains a ―non-interference‖ approach, resulting in there being little, if any, intervention 
in investment matters by this institution.
203
 Despite attracting more FDI, these regulations do not necessarily 
increase the potential impacts of FDI on economic growth and poverty reduction in Zambia. In paragraph 5.4 of 
this report the efforts of the Zambian government to get more benefits from the FDI inflows will be further 
explained.  
 
Cultural and language differences between foreign investors and host countries can lead to substantial 
problems. The fact that Zambia is an Anglophone country makes it an attractive FDI destination for investors 
from the US, UK and SA; for Chinese investors it is more challenging. Both investors from the UK and China 
recognise the importance of respecting cultural subtleties in order to succeed in Zambia as became apparent 
during our interviews with foreign investors in Zambia. Zambians are seen as being ―very friendly‖ as was 
commented by an interlocutor from ZDA, this in turn creates a more pleasant investment environment.
204
 Yet, 
according to our interlocutor from the ZDA, Zambia is still a country with rich customs and traditions that, for 
instance, can impact the ease of ―doing business‖ in Zambia.  
 
Focusing on political factors, the majority of interviewees noted that although bureaucracy does hinder FDI into 
Zambia, it has improved drastically from its position in the 1970s. The cost of setting up a business in Zambia 
has reduced significantly, with now 200 licences needed to begin trading, as opposed to the 500 which were 
needed at the beginning of this century (however the formalisation of this by Parliament is still underway).
205
 The 
ZDA argues thereby that corruption has lowered over the past three years due to incentives provided by the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a US-sponsored initiative. However, the current government is said to be 
less focused on fighting corruption than the previous government.
206 
 
 
Despite the weak transport infrastructure and relatively high levels of bureaucracy evident in the country, the 
stable political environment, abundance of resources and certain tax benefits for locals and foreign investors 
alike make Zambia an attractive FDI destination. Besides attracting FDI to the country itself, the good business 
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climate also made Zambia attractive as a hub for investment in the region. For example, one of our interviewees 
from the SADC Secretariat noted that Zambia ―is increasingly being used as a launch pad for conducting 
business in the DRC,‖ as meetings are facilitated with foreign direct investors in Zambia. 
4.2.3  The role of FDI in the economy of Zambia 
 
In the previous section it was explained how the economic liberalisation in Zambia since 1991 had a positive 
impact on FDI inflow into Zambia. In this section it will be analysed whether and how the increased FDI inflows in 
the country have impacted positively on poverty reduction. As explained in the section on the conceptualisation 
of FDI, the concepts poverty and development have subjective elements which make it important to take the 
specific context (time and place) into account and to study the concepts from different perspectives. The Centre 
for Chinese Studies‘ (CCS) research team therefore interviewed government officials, investors and members of 
the civil society in order to get as broad as possible a picture of how FDI can contribute to poverty reduction in 
Zambia. 
 
The Zambian government puts a lot of effort into attracting FDI. From the perspective of an interlocutor at the 
ZDA, the increased FDI inflows in the country have created employment and thus impacted positively on poverty 
reduction. According to an interviewee from the ZDA, FDI inflows to the agricultural sector are especially 
important as it is the largest sector of employment in Zambia. Within this sector there is a considerable volume of 
FDI from the UK. According to this representative of ZDA, the FDI from the UK in the agricultural sector is of key 
significance in creating jobs and the benefits arising from it directly lift people out of poverty in rural areas.
207
 The 
interviewee from MOFCOM elaborated more on these benefits and argued that the implementation of irrigation 
and building wells by foreign investors can be seen as a positive impact on the local community. Due to the 
climate of Zambia there can be no rain in the country for six months at a time, meaning irrigation is essential. 
However, the question is how long-term the benefits of these investments are for the local community. For 
example, according to the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) and the Jesuit Centre for Theological 
Reflection (JCTR) as non-governmental organisations, few techniques and skills are shared when foreign 
investors undertake work in Zambia. This means that the benefits for the local community only last as long as 
the irrigation installations and wells, for example, last. Another important factor that was raised in the 
conceptualisation section and that needs further research is whether there is a difference between techniques 
used by investors from developing countries (SA and China in this research) and developed countries (the UK 
and US in this research) and the ease of which it can be applied to the Zambian context. This requires more in-
depth research of specific projects and interviews with locals on a big scale.   
 
Another important distinction that was made in the conceptualisation section of this report is the distinction 
between greenfield and brownfield FDI. A good example of greenfield FDI are the investments of South African 
retailers in Zambia. In the 1990s a number of SA retail investors, such as Shoprite, entered the Zambian market, 
creating a revival of the retail market following the socialist period in Zambia. At the moment, South African 
                                            
207
 Interview with ZDA representative on 22 October 2010. 
 Page | 58  
 
investors dominate the retail sector in Zambia. In theory, greenfield investments are expected to create new 
long-term jobs in the foreign country by hiring new employees. However, in the case of this example of the South 
African retailers labour and produce were brought into the country and these businesses were thereby 
accustomed to leave relatively soon after setting up.
208
 This created negative sentiment and distrust among 
Zambians by the lack of positive benefits for the country itself.  
4.2.4 Regulations to manage FDI and reap the benefits 
 
Attracting FDI is not enough for economic growth; the host country needs to have policies in place in order to 
reap the benefits of this FDI. So far, this report has shown how the Zambian Government‘s monetary policy is 
geared to make the environment for starting business in Zambia as conducive as possible. Yet, the rising 
pressure from the Zambian civil society created awareness amongst both the Zambian government and foreign 
investors about the need to change their strategies and policies.  
 
For example, the Zambian government is putting rules and regulations in place ensuring that predominantly local 
labour and produce are used in stores.
209  
For the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
210
 in 
Zambia, for example, Chinese investors were asked to give priority to local suppliers for goods and services, 
before procured from somewhere else, to avoid ―adversely affecting the growth of local industries.‖
211 
In addition, 
the Zambian Government has frequently pronounced import and export bans on agricultural staples as a means 
to ensure the prominence of domestic supply across the country.
212
 This policy is now more widely applied to 
other foreign investors, as for example the SA retailer Pick ’n Pay mentioned before.
213
 
 
The South African retailer Pick ’n Pay decided to aim for selling even higher percentages of local products than 
is required by the Zambian government.
214
 These new regulations and strategies are meant to increase the 
positive impacts of FDI inflows on poverty reduction in Zambia, by providing jobs and access to the formalised 
economy for small farmers in Zambia. In addition, the construction of stores and shopping malls can be seen to 
be positive for local development, as it requires a significant amount of local labour.
215
 Furthermore, the 
availability of higher quality goods at a lower price has significantly impacted the lives of middle-class Zambians. 
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Recognition is granted to the fact that there are benefits to be gained through enriching the community, in the 
hope of it being channelled back to the retail sector. These developments show the important balance between 
opening up the market for foreign investors on the one hand, and protecting the local market in order to benefit 
from the FDI inflow on the other hand.  
 
When speaking with members of the civil society, they raised the view that the Zambian government is not in a 
strong enough position to set terms for FDI in favour of its national interest.
216
 This is of importance, as the 
Zambian government has made the country attractive for investors, as previously shown, yet there are few 
examples of the government managing the FDI inflows in such a way that it actually benefits the Zambian 
population. The interviewee from the CSRP stated that management is needed in the form of positive 
employment practice being enforced by the government; including higher, fairer remuneration for employees and 
a form of punishment for foreign investors when violent reactions to labour unrest takes place. The Zambian 
government relaxed the rules and regulations for foreign investors because FDI was needed to ―kick start the 
development process,‖ as local developers did not have access to the required amount of capital alone, and thus 
FDI could help to improve the production base of the country through generating revenue, taxes and 
employment opportunities for locals.
217
 According to a representative of the JCTR, Zambia has always welcomed 
FDI with open arms and this eagerness to attract investment means that Zambia allows investment in without 
fully considering the impact it has on local markets and local labour, poverty reduction, development and the 
environment.
218 
 
 
Despite attempts from foreign investors to create a kind of win-win situation in which both the investors and the 
local community of the host country benefit from the investments, it is in the end the responsibility of 
governments to ensure that the appropriate political and macroeconomic conditions are in place so that FDI 
contributes to the country‘s development aspirations, as has been argued in section one of this report. The key 
point here is the ability and willingness to exercise sovereignty. According to the definition of the UN, a sovereign 
state should have an effective and independent government within a defined territory. Therefore, it can be 
suggested that if a country wants to be a sovereign nation state, the government needs to be able to regulate 
FDI inflows. However, on the other hand, if a country wants to be a sovereign nation state it should also take 
responsibility for its national companies operating abroad as well. In other words, exercising sovereignty comes 
with responsibility and evading responsibility decreases a country‘s ability to exercise sovereignty. 
   
The next section will provide an overview of recommendations from stakeholders involved in FDI inflows to 
Zambia for the Zambian government to increase the positive impacts of FDI to poverty reduction. 
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4.2.5  Key points by stakeholders for improvement of FDI climate 
 
Civil society groups in Zambia
219
 agree with the Zambian government that inflows are necessary for Zambia‘s 
development since local entrepreneurs do not have the resources to bring up the required investment to ―kick 
start the development process‖. Attracting foreign capital, according to the interviewee from CSPR, helps to 
improve the productive base of the country. It thereby generates revenue, taxes and it creates employment 
opportunities for locals. However, as both he and a representative from the JCTR pointed out, these potential 
positive impacts of FDI are minimized by the fact that massive tax incentives are offered to investors. This 
means that companies do not make significant contributions to the national revenue through taxes and only 
really contribute through income tax. Tax holidays and minimal company tax further compound the lack of 
contribution by companies.
220
 The CSPR has been lobbying for the restoration of the windfall tax, i.e. profit 
revenues are taxed and budgeted for redistribution.  
 
The Zambian government needs thereby to ensure that the local people living off the land wanted by investors 
are compensated for any loss of land. The interviewee from the ZDA stated that this practice was in place, which 
was challenged by a representative from the CSPR, who noted that this was an ideal which has not been met.  
 
Our interviewee from the CSPR in Zambia further pointed out that ―promised effects of FDI have not been 
visible.‖ Little information is provided by the government on the results or benefits to the electorate on the real 
development as a result of FDI, such as better labour rates, improved services, or the actual correlation between 
growth and poverty reduction. According to our interviewee from the JCTR in Zambia, the impact of FDI on 
poverty reduction in Zambia is especially difficult to trace in the private sector. According to her, it is easier to 
gauge impacts when companies are state-owned because then companies have certain obligations which they 
have to meet with regard to contributing to the education and health sectors for example.  
 
Most of the foreign investors interviewed stressed that the establishment of the ZDA was a much needed 
improvement in the support from the Zambian government towards foreign investors. However, they also had 
some suggestions for the improvement of the services of the ZDA. Despite the ZDA enhancing clarity 
surrounding the many rules and regulations necessary to conduct FDI in Zambia, it was suggested that having 
such information in a number of languages would be beneficial; for example a Chinese version could provide a 
more clear understanding for Chinese investors who have limited English language skills.
221 
In addition, 
interviewees stressed the integral work of the ZDA but noted that it would be very useful to have the website 
updated more frequently.  
 
In conclusion, the Zambian government puts a lot of effort in attracting FDI and improving its business 
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environment. Despite the improvements in the business environment of Zambia, there is still much room for 
improvement according to the foreign investors interviewed.  
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
The aim of this report is to provide a better understanding of the specificities of Chinese FDI and its role in the 
economic development in Southern Africa by examining Chinese FDI in the broader context of FDI inflows to 
Africa and in comparison with the FDI from other main investing countries. This concluding section is divided into 
four separate paragraphs in order to structurally answer the main research question:  
 
How does Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) compare to OFDI from the three other main FDI 
source countries to the SADC region, and Zambia more specifically, and how are SADC and Zambia managing 
the Chinese FDI inflow and its potential impacts on poverty reduction? 
 
To conclude this section with reflections on the limitations of this study and our recommendations: 
 
5.1  Similarities and differences between the major investors in the region 
 
With regard to the management of FDI, China has commonalities with both the UK and SA. The centralised 
structure with a central entity at state level to support and regulate OFDI in China shows similarities with how 
OFDI is supported and regulated by the government of the UK and the more long-term perspective of China‘s 
FDI strategy shows similarities with SA. An important difference however, is that the UK manages ODA in a 
separate central entity, namely DFID, while in China it is regulated by the same Ministry as FDI (MOFCOM). The 
main conclusion of this report is that China should not be treated as different to other investor countries by the 
CSOs and Zambian government. It bears little fruit to single out Chinese investments while FDI from other major 
investors carry equal positive and negative consequences. Instead, a greater degree of agency (or leverage) is 
needed by African stakeholders (government and civil society) over the direction, modalities and targeting of 
FDI, regardless of the investment home country.  
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5.2  Are SADC and Zambia ready for Chinese FDI? 
 
Both the SADC and Zambia have made substantial improvements in creating a more attractive business 
environment and in attracting FDI over the past twenty years. Despite these changes, foreign investors see 
much room for improvement. Recommendations from stakeholders for how SADC can better attract FDI remain 
focused on the need to reduce the costs of doing business. In theory the FIP and the planned regional economic 
integration in the SADC does increase the attractiveness of the investment climate of SADC, yet these strategies 
are not being fully implemented due to the limited capacity of SADC due to its bottom-up approach. 
 
The lack of good infrastructure in both Zambia and the SADC was raised by the majority of our interviewees. 
Thus, the roads and other forms of transport need to be improved in order to bring down the comparatively high 
investment costs for investors.  
 
Attracting FDI is not enough for economic growth; the host country needs to have policies in place in order to 
reap the benefits of this FDI. It has been suggested that SADC is limited in its capabilities to manage FDI due to 
its bottom-up approach. In Zambia civil society members argue that the Zambian government is not in a strong 
enough position to set terms for FDI in favour of its national interest. The Zambian government has made the 
country attractive for investors, yet there are few examples of the government managing the FDI inflows in such 
a way that it actually benefits the Zambian population.  
 
Good examples of how the Zambian government tries to better manage FDI are the fairly new rules and 
regulations stating that stores have to predominantly use local labour and produce.
 
In addition, the Zambian 
government has frequently pronounced import and export bans on agricultural staples, as a means to ensure the 
prominence of domestic supply across the country. However, civil society groups in Zambia complain about the 
visibility of the positive impacts of FDI towards poverty reduction in the country and ask the Zambian government 
to release results of the impacts of FDI on the local population to make the link between FDI and development 
better visible. 
 
5.3 Reflection on limitations of this study 
 
This research project initiated with a broad scope, yet there was limited time available to conduct the research: 
thus, it became apparent that the focus of the project needed to be tapered. In order to gain the necessary focus 
within the set timeframe, the decision was made to focus on a specific region in Africa, namely the SADC region, 
and to explore the perspectives of the potential impacts of FDI towards poverty reduction, as opposed to 
examining the actual impacts. Despite this narrowed focus, the time schedule nonetheless proved to be an issue 
and collecting the necessary data was challenging.  
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A number of precincts were experienced when gathering detailed information concerning investments in the 
SADC region from all four of the FDI source countries researched within this study. Firstly, employees of the 
respective government departments of the FDI source countries were unable to provide comprehensive 
information on investments in the SADC region originating from their country due to ―commercial interests,‖ as 
was the highly limiting factor when collecting UK related data.
222
 Secondly, issues related to the protection of 
intellectual property were granted as reason for SA not being able to provide further data. The third key hurdle 
encountered was that the various government departments could not find the information we requested; both the 
UK and SA government department representatives appeared surprised that they did not have the required data 
concerning FDI outflow from their country. As previously noted, the US was able to provide the most 
comprehensive data of the four FDI source countries, with the UK, SA and China unable to provide an overview 
of their OFDI to the separate SADC countries, nor a further breakdown of their OFDI per sector within the SADC 
region. Thus, the critique on China that their activities on the African continent are not transparent, or that they 
do not specifically disclose information on OFDI or ODA, appears to unfortunately also apply in the case of OFDI 
from other main FDI source countries researched. 
 
Another challenge experienced when comparing information was that the data from the FDI home countries 
sometimes differed from the data recorded by the receiving countries. For example, there is a huge difference 
between what UNCTAD reported for Chinese OFDI and what MOFCOM put forward. Furthermore, 
representatives of the South African embassy in Beijing recognised that they had different data than the figures 
published in the first report from the China Africa Research Centre at MOFCOM. This South African embassy 
approached MOFCOM about the matter and it was decided to set up a joint committee together in order to clear 
up the confusion surrounding this discrepancy. To illustrate, some of the factors identified that can result in 
differences between the figures are: what is meant by Chinese FDI (mainland and to which degree are exports 
via Macau and Hong Kong included; is Taiwan accounted for separately?), from which harbour do you record 
figures (the Chinese or African harbours?), and how big needs the percentage of ownership to be in order for the 
investment to be counted as FDI? 
 
As explained briefly before, for the scope of this research it was not possible to study the actual impacts of FDI, 
as this would require more detailed and more long-term research with a baseline study; however the benefit of 
analysing the potential impacts and perceptions of the key stakeholders became increasingly apparent whilst 
conducting this research. 
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5.4  Recommendations  
 
Following the general finding of this report on the importance of regulation in FDI ―host‖ countries (which receive 
the FDI), the main recommendations are directed towards the organisation of SADC and the Zambian 
Government.  
 
 SADC should improve its investment climate for foreign investors by reducing the costs of doing 
business in the region. One way of achieving this is by speeding up set targets for political and economic 
integration; improving interconnectivity and thereby enlarging the market size and attractiveness. 
 
 As a landlocked country, Zambia should put more effort into improving its infrastructure (e.g. through 
better linking ODA and FDI in a coherent step-by-step plan) in order to attract more FDI. More and better 
regulated FDI is a precondition to have more gains in poverty reduction. 
 
 A lack of transparency within the Zambian government regarding deals with foreign investors was named 
as concern by Zambian CSOs. More disclosure on details of the deals by the Zambian government 
would be demanded from these actors.   
  
 Zambia‘s decision-makers need to consistently ask about protection of its citizens, future generations 
and the environment. Regulation of these aspects is arguably a key task for government when engaging 
with multinationals.  
 
 In order to better regulate FDI, the Zambian government should make information better available to 
investors about rules and regulations in Zambia. One measure to do so would be a more frequent 
update of the website of the Zambian Development Agency (ZDA). Another measure would be to make 
Zambian business law available in Mandarin for Chinese investors, which could make Zambia a more 
attractive destination for Chinese FDI. Another positive consequence could be to improve law 
enforcement: Chinese companies who operate abroad have to comply with local laws and regulations. 
The first step to compliance is to understand the legislation.  
 
 In order to make an informed decision on how best to regulate FDI, the Zambian government should 
consider conducting a study on the reasons why foreign investors choose to invest in the country. If the 
reason is to be found in country-specific factors (e.g. raw materials), the Zambian government could 
better protect its citizens and the environment with stricter regulation without running the immediate risk 
of losing foreign investors. 
 
 NGOs can assist both CSOs and governments of the SADC countries with conducting such a study by 
providing detailed information on the motivations for Chinese investors to invest in the specific countries 
within the SADC region. 
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 FDI home countries have limited legal responsibility for how their national companies are operating 
abroad since that would question the right of sovereignty. However, CSO‘s can use the technique of 
naming and shaming: publication of bad practices of companies from a certain nationality can lead to 
stricter control by their home government. CSO‘s could instead also focus on the consuming countries 
and make information available about bad practices of companies in their country for the consumers 
abroad.   
 
 The findings of this study show that the bottom-up approach to governance of SADC is restricting the 
role of the SADC secretariat regulating and controlling FDI inflows to the region. The member states 
have a lot of clout and autonomy over their FDI inflows and SADC appears more as a facilitating 
authority. At present there is no common strategy concerning FDI in SADC. The first task for SADC is 
therefore to extract and promote lessons for the rest of the region. The regional body should study 
especially best practice examples in attracting FDI, not least so from Mauritius.
223 
While the first and 
foremost aim of SADC countries might be to attract FDI, disseminating knowledge on how to manage 
FDI in such a way that it benefits the development of the region should also be a key focus of SADC.  
 
 To the four FDI source countries researched in this report, we recommend the need to ensure a more 
comprehensive recording of data concerning their country‘s FDI outflow, in addition to making the 
information available for public access in the near future. As previously noted, the importance of African 
countries as a destination for global FDI is increasing despite their relatively small market sizes; hence it 
is crucial for FDI source countries to maintain records of their FDI outflows to them. At present there 
appears to be significantly limited collection of data concerning the SADC region. A more thorough and 
transparent recording could serve to benefit both FDI source and host countries: it could contribute to 
decreasing speculation of neo-colonialism of FDI source countries, in addition to the possibility of 
attracting further FDI for host countries due to heightened recognition of the possibilities of investing in 
the country. 
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Annex  
 
Table 1: Volume of FDI inflow per region, 2000-2009 (in USD million) 
       Year 
 
Region 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
US 313997 159478 74501 53141 135850 104809 237136 265957 324560 129883 
EU 698224 383962 309531 259503 213881 502235 586815 923810 536917 361949 
Asia 148736 114040 218525 117180 271113 215769 283113 336922 372738 301367 
Gulf 
States 
331 1894 2734 6134 14145 21318 38080 46911 60060 50851 
South 
America 
57056 37851 28209 22936 37139 44248 43837 71562 91670 54754 
Africa  9829 19995 16074 20418 21726 38197 55382 63092 72178 58563 
World 1401466 825280 628114 565739 732397 985796 1459133 2099973 1770873 1117189 
Africa’s% 
of 
World’s 
total FDI   
0.70% 2.42% 2.56% 3.61% 2.97% 3.87% 3.80% 3.00% 4.08% 5.24% 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2010). ―World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-
Carbon Economy‖New York and Geneva: United Nations Publication. Statistics last accessed on 25.08.2010 from 
http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=4031.htm. 
 
 
Table 2: The World Bank Rankings for Ease of Doing Business in Zambia (out of 183 economies) 
Starting a Business data Doing Business 
2008 
Doing Business 
2009 
Doing Business 
2010 
Doing Business 
2011 
Rank - - 93 57 
Procedures (number) 6 6 6 6 
Time (days) 33 18 18 18 
Cost (percentage of income 
per capita) 
30.5 26.8 28.4 27.9 
Min. capital (percentage of 
income per capita) 
2.2 1.5 1.3 0.0 
Source: The World Bank. 2010. ―Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations‖ [Online] Available:  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/zambia [18 November 2010]. 
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Table 3: The World Bank Rankings for Ease of Doing Business: Starting a Business in Zambia 
Topic Rankings 2010 Rank 2011 Rank Change in Rank 
Overall Ease of Doing Business Rank 84  76 8 
Starting a Business 93 57 36  
Dealing with Construction Permits 159  158 1  
Registering Property 93 83 10  
Getting Credit 14 6 8  
Protecting Investors 73 74 -1  
Paying Taxes 36 37 -1  
Trading Across Borders 157 150 7  
Enforcing Contracts 87 86 1  
Closing a Business 84 97 -13  
Source: The World Bank. 2010. ―Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations‖ [Online] Available:  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/zambia [18 November 2010]. 
 
 
Table 4: Volume of FDI inflow per country in the SADC region, 2000-2009 (in USD million)   
        Year 
 
Country 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
Angola 879 2145 3133 5685 5606 6794 9064 9796 16581 13101 
Botswana 57 31 403 418 391 279 486 495 521 234 
DRC 72 80 141 391 409 … 256 1808 1727 951 
Lesotho 32 28 27 42 53 57 89 97 56 48 
Madagascar 83 93 61 95 95 86 294 777 1180 543 
Malawi 40 60 17 66 108 52 72 92 170 60 
Mauritius 277 -26 32 62 11 42 105 339 383 257 
Mozambique 139 255 347 337 245 108 154 427 592 881 
Namibia 186 365 181 149 226 348 387 733 720 516 
Seychelles 448 554 683 685 723 808 906 856 557 1114 
South Africa 887 6784 1569 734 798 6647 -527 5695 9006 5696 
Swaziland 106 29 92 -61 71 -46 121 37 106 66 
Tanzania 282 467 388 308 331 494 597 647 679 645 
Zambia 122 72 303 347 364 357 616 1324 939 959 
Zimbabwe 23 4 26 4 9 103 40 69 52 60 
Total 
Southern 
Africa 
 
3633 
 
10941 
 
7403 
 
9262 
 
8717 
 
9440 
 
12660 
 
23192 
 
33278 
 
25131 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2010. ―World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-
Carbon Economy‖ New York and Geneva: United Nations Publication. Statistics [Online] Available:  
http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=4031.html [18 November 2010].  
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Table 5: Total US FDI Africa, SADC, and Zambia from 2000-2009 (in USD million)   
       Year 
 
 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
Total US 
FDI 
1316247 1460352  1616548 1769631 2160844 2241656 2477268 2993980 3219725 3508142 
US FDI 
to Africa 
11891 15574 16040 19835 20356 22756 28158 32607  37221 44805 
US FDI 
to SADC 
4593  4761 4756 5007 5754 5900 6958 9926 9942 12228 
US FDI 
to 
Zambia 
41 48 44 45 36 35 74 76 79 95 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis International Economic Accounts. ‖U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Balance of 
Payments and Direct Investment Position Data‖ [Online] http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal.htm [4 November 2010].  
 
Table 6: Total US FDI to SADC per country, 2000-2009 (in USD million)   
        Year 
 
Country 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
Angola 585 1220 1110 1067 1206 1197 1540 1633 2303 2605 
Botswana 13 17 21 3 11 (D) (D) 19 22 24 
DRC 102 96 70 55 65 51 21 (D) (D) (D) 
Lesotho 3 3 3 3 0 0 0  3 0 3 
Madagascar (*) (*) (*) (*) 6 -5 -17 -29 -38 -47 
Malawi -4 -8 -10 8 10 5 5 3 1 (*) 
Mauritius 97 124 (*) 10 373 624 1272 2973 2645 3579 
Mozambique 3 8 12 13 (D) (*) 6 5 5 4 
Namibia (*) (*) (*) (*) 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Seychelles (*) (*) 4 (D) (D) (D) (*) (*) (D) 40 
South Africa 3562 3070 3334 3580 3913 3969 3980 5240 4919 5922 
Swaziland 59 45 (D) 65 (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) 
Tanzania 39 21 22 18 22 21 (D) (D) (D) (D) 
Zambia 41 48 44 45 36 35 74 76 79 95 
Zimbabwe 93 117 146 140 109 (D) 73 (D) (D) (D) 
Total 
Southern 
Africa 
4593 4 61 4756 5007 5754 5900 6958 9926 9942 12228 
Key:  
(D) Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.   
(*) A nonzero value between – USD 500,000 and USD 500,000. 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis International Economic Accounts. ―U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Balance of 
Payments and Direct Investment Position Data‖ [Online] http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal.htm [4 November 2010].  
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 Table 7: Total UK FDI to Africa, SADC, and Zambia from 2000-2009 (in USD million)
224
   
       Year 
 
 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
 2009 
Total UK 
FDI 
897845*
** 
869700*
** 
994136*
** 
1187046
*** 
1247190
*** 
1198637
*** 
1454904
*** 
1835639
*** 
1531128
*** 
1651727
*** 
UK FDI 
to Africa 
2228* 1832* 3492* 5493* 9324* 10780* ** ** ** ** 
UK FDI 
to SADC 
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
UK FDI 
to 
Zambia 
** ** ** ** ** ** 17* 57* 210* ** 
Key:  
* Approximate figure as converted using rate of day as of 24th November 2010 of GBP 1 is equal to USD 1.59027 – used 
http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/. * Data provided by contact at the Office for National Statistics, cited as 
―ONSONS MA4‖ 
** Statistics not made available by source. 
*** Statistics obtained from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
 
Source: Data provided by contact at the Office for National Statistics, cited as ―ONSONS MA4‖. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2010. ―Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment stock, annual, 
1980-2009‖ [Online] http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx [25 November 2010]. 
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 Limitations of data – UK 
The UK data tables were compiled using data granted by the UK ONS and UNCTAD. In both the above and below table, data for the whole 
table was requested and searched for using UNCTAD, the FCO, the UKTI, and the ONS. There appeared to be little knowledge of whether 
this specified data was available or where it could be obtained from. Research concluded the ONS should have the fullest record of the data, 
yet contact with the ONS only resulted in gaining the data presented in these tables, despite asking for data to cover the breadth of the 
tables. The ONS clarified that they were the key source for FDI outflow figures concerning the UK, and noted that this was the only 
information they had regarding UK FDI to the respective countries and region, in addition to not being willing to disclose elements of it. 
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Table 8: Total UK FDI to SADC per country, 2000-2009 (in USD million)   
        Year 
 
Country 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
Angola ** ** ** ** ** ** (D) (D) (D) ** 
Botswana ** ** ** ** ** ** 76* 70* 95* ** 
DRC ** ** ** ** ** ** (D) (D) (D) ** 
Lesotho ** ** ** ** ** ** (D) (D) (D) ** 
Madagascar ** ** ** ** ** ** (D) (D) (D) ** 
Malawi ** ** ** ** ** ** 10* 8* 10* ** 
Mauritius ** ** ** ** ** ** -1991* 601* -719* ** 
Mozambique ** ** ** ** ** ** 38* 8* 38* ** 
Namibia ** ** ** ** ** ** (D) (D) 40* ** 
Seychelles ** ** ** ** ** ** (D) 52* (D) ** 
South Africa 1000* 517* 3602* 3534* 6107* 9090* 2331* 2758* 2225* ** 
Swaziland ** ** ** ** ** ** (D) (D) (D) ** 
Tanzania ** ** ** ** ** ** 5* 62* 27* ** 
Zambia ** ** ** ** ** ** 17* 57* 210* ** 
Zimbabwe 60* 64* 52* 59* 145* 40* 13* 6* -10* ** 
Total 
Southern 
Africa 
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Key:  
(D) Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.   
* Approximate figure as converted using rate of day as of 24th November 2010 of GBP 1 is equal to USD 1.59027 – used 
http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/. * Data provided by contact at the Office for National Statistics, cited as ―ONSONS 
MA4 
** Statistics not made available by source. 
  
Source: Data provided by contact at the Office for National Statistics, cited as ―ONS MA4‖. 
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Table 9: Total Chinese FDI to Africa, SADC, and Zambia from 2000-2009 (in USD million)
225  
 
       Year 
 
 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
Total 
Chinese 
FDI 
* 
(915.777 
**) 
* 
(6885.39
8 **) 
* 
(2518.40
7 **) 
2854.65 
(2854.65
**) 
5497.99 
(5497.99
**) 
12261.1
7 
(12261.1
7 8*) 
17633.9
7 
(21160 
**) 
26506.0
9 
(22468.8
6 **) 
55907.1
7 
(52150**
) 
56528.99 
(48000**
) 
Chinese 
FDI to 
Africa 
* * * 74.81 317.43 391.68 519.86 1574.31 5490.55 1438.87 
Chinese 
FDI to 
SADC 
* * * 27.04 49.5 75.11 224.69 722.88 5182.96 506.38 
Chinese 
FDI to 
Zambia 
* * * 5.53 2.23 10.09 87.44 119.34 213.97 111.8 
Key:  
*    statistics not presented by MOFCOM 
**  statistics obtained from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
 
Sources:  
MOFCOM. 2009. ―Statistical Bulletin of China‘s Outward Foreign Direct Investment: Statistics on China‘s Outflows FDI― 
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2010. ―Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment stock, annual, 
1980-2009‖ [Online] http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx [25 November 2010] 
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  Limitations of data - China 
China‘s MOFCOM provided the majority of data for these tables concerning China‘s FDI. However, the years 2000-2002 were not made 
available by MOFCOM, or that concerning the amount of FDI to specific sectors within the SADC countries. The total amount of FDI outflow 
from China globally has been provided from UNCTAD to show both the data from the years not provided by MOFCOM and the apparent 
discrepancies and similarities between the data sources. 
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Table 10: Total Chinese FDI to SADC per country, 2000-2009 (in USD million)   
        Year 
 
Country 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
Angola ** ** ** 0.19 0.18 0.47 22.39 41.19 -9.57 8.31 
Botswana ** ** ** 0.8 0.27 3.69 2.76 1.87 14.06 0.09 
DRC ** ** ** 0.06 11.91 5.07 36.73 57.27 23.99 227.16 
Lesotho ** ** ** * 0.03 0.6 * * 0.62 0.1 
Madagascar ** ** ** 0.68 13.64 0.14 1.17 13.24 61.16 42.56 
Malawi ** ** ** * * * * 0.2 5.44 * 
Mauritius ** ** ** 10.27 0.44 2.04 16.59 15.58 34.44 14.12 
Mozambique ** ** ** * 0.66 2.88 0 10.03 5.85 15.85 
Namibia ** ** ** 0.62 0 0.18 0.85 0.91 7.59 11.62 
Seychelles ** ** ** * * 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.36 
South Africa ** ** ** 8.86 17.81 47.47 454.41 454.41 4807.86 41.59 
Swaziland ** ** ** ** 
 
** ** ** ** ** ** 
Tanzania ** ** ** * 1.62 0.96 12.54 -3.82 18.22 21.58 
Zambia ** ** ** 5.53 2.23 10.09 87.44 119.34 213.97 111.8 
Zimbabwe ** ** ** 0.03 1.47 1.47 3.42 12.57 -0.72 11.24 
Total 
Southern 
Africa 
** ** ** 27.04 49.5 75.11 224.69 722.88 5182.96 506.38 
Key:  
*     statistics not available  
**  statistics not presented by MOFCOM 
 
Source: MOFCOM. 2009. ―Statistical Bulletin of China‘s Outward Foreign Direct Investment: Statistics on China‘s Outflows 
FDI― 
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Table 11: Total SA FDI to Africa, SADC, and Zambia from 2000-2009 (in USD million)
226 
  
       Year 
 
 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
Total SA 
FDI 
32.325 
*** 
17.580 
*** 
21.980 
*** 
24.185 
*** 
39.083 
*** 
37.706 
*** 
50.826 
*** 
65.878 
*** 
49.788 
*** 
64.309 
*** 
SA FDI 
to Africa 
3426* 2438* 4253* 4578* 5197* 5222* 11343* 16616* ** ** 
SA FDI 
to SADC 
** ** ** 2395.7 2337.3 2880.9 3012.7 3323.3 ** ** 
SA FDI 
to 
Zambia 
** ** ** 160.4 233.3 278.8 346.9 378.7 ** ** 
Key:  
*    Approximate figure as converted using rate of day as of 24
th
 November 2010 of R 1 is equal to USD 0.14174 – used 
http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/   
**   statistics not presented by South African Reserve Bank 
***  statistics obtained from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
 
Sources:  
South African Reserve Bank. ―South African Foreign Assets‖ Quarterly Bulletin, September 2010. Page: 87. 
  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. ―Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment stock, annual, 1980-
2009‖ [Online] Available: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx [25 November 2010]. 
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  Limitations of data – South Africa 
The data and figures obtained for Table 7 on the total South African FDI, 2002–2008 was obtained from the South African Reserve Bank, 
Quarterly Bulletinn, and September 2010. Because data was difficult to obtain regarding total South African FDI to SADC per country, 2003-
2007 (Table 8) data was obtained from a Discussion Paper, ―The Role of South African FDI in Southern Africa‖ by Draper, P. Kiratu, S. and 
Samuel, C. In the process of gathering statistical data for the South African country profile, many limitations were found. Numerous South 
African financial institutions (South African Reserve Bank, South African Revenue Service etc.), government departments (Department of 
Trade and Industry, National Treasury etc.) and South African financial and economic experts were contacted; however little data was made 
available from these relevant sources.  
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Table 12: Total SA FDI to SADC per country, 2000-2009 (in USD million)   
        Year 
 
Country 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
Angola ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Botswana ** ** ** 197.7 222.6 229.9 334.6 625.4 ** ** 
DRC ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Lesotho ** ** ** 152.6 164.1 155.3 216.7 190.4 ** ** 
Madagascar ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Malawi ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Mauritius ** ** ** 1116.7 1535.1 811.0 5230.2 4974.1 ** ** 
Mozambique ** ** ** 871.8 962.1 1040.0 1055.4 1204.1 ** ** 
Namibia ** ** ** 658.5 595.3 675.7 567.2 569.5 ** ** 
Seychelles ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Swaziland ** ** ** 181.2 200.7 168.8 344.6 385.3 ** ** 
Tanzania ** ** ** ** ** ** **  ** ** 
Zambia ** ** ** 160.4 233.3 278.8 346.9 378.7 ** ** 
Zimbabwe ** ** ** 354.7 159.9 227.7 265.2 404.9 ** ** 
Total 
Southern 
Africa 
** ** ** 2395.7 2337.3 2880.9 3012.7 3323.3 ** ** 
Key:  
** statistics not presented by Draper et al 
 
Sources:  
SAIIA‘s calculations from SARB data  
 
Draper, P. Kiratu, S. and Smauel, C. 2010. ―The Role of South African FDI in Southern Africa‖ in Discussion Paper. 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). 
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Flow diagram 1: OFDI in the American context 
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Flow diagram 2: OFDI in the United Kingdom context 
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Flow diagram 3: OFDI in the Chinese context 
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Flow diagram 4: OFDI in the South African context 
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